Essays In Labor And Education Economics by Kopkin, Nolan
  
 
 
 
ESSAYS IN LABOR AND EDUCATION ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Nolan Andrew Kopkin 
May 2013
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 Nolan Andrew Kopkin
 iii 
 
ESSAYS IN LABOR AND EDUCATION ECONOMICS 
Nolan Andrew Kopkin, Ph. D. 
Cornell University 2013 
 
In chapter 1, I explore the relationship between discrimination towards blacks and the black-
white self-employment rate gap, and provide the first direct empirical evidence that 
discrimination negatively impacts black self-employment.  As a proxy for discrimination, I 
construct a measure of prejudicial attitudes using responses from the 1993-2010 General Social 
Survey.  After compiling an index of prejudicial attitudes, I estimate the relationship between 
self-employment and this index of prejudicial attitudes using the 2005-2009 American 
Community Survey.  I find that an amount of prejudice equal to the difference in the least and 
most prejudiced census divisions increases the black-white self-employment rate gap by 24.2%-
34.5%. 
In chapter 2, I examine how income tax rates affect the labor migration decisions of NBA free 
agents.  By using a dataset of professional basketball players' free agent contracts from the 
National Basketball Association (NBA) between the 2001-2002 and 2007-2008 seasons, I am 
able to identify the effect that changes in income tax rates have on the labor migration decisions 
of NBA free agents.  I find that an increase in the marginal income tax rate faced by NBA 
basketball players that play for a given team leads to a decrease in the average skill of the NBA 
free agents that migrate to that team. 
In chapter 3, I study how a nutritional improvement in school provided meals affects student 
outcomes.  There has recently been an emphasis on decreasing childhood obesity and increasing 
the health of schoolchildren in the United States.  Improving the nutritional content of school 
meals is one potential mechanism for achieving these goals.  In addition to direct health benefits, 
these interventions may provide positive effects on students’ academic and behavioral outcomes.  
In 2007, the Buffalo Public School District implemented the Healthier Options for Public 
Schoolchildren (HOPS) program, which increased the nutritional content of food provided at 
school.  I find that students in HOPS schools experienced a statistically significant increase in 
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standardized math test scores, particularly among low ability, high income, and female students.  
Additionally, I find that the intervention had no impact on standardized English test scores, 
attendance, or suspensions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
DOES DISCRIMINATION AFFECT BLACK ENTREPRENEURSHIP? 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last hundred years in the United States, the black self-employment rate has been 
roughly one-third to one-half of the white self-employment rate (Fairlie and Meyer, 2000).  
According to the 2010 American Community Survey, while 6.8% of whites own their own 
businesses, only 3.6% of blacks do.1  In fact, whites own 83.4% of the businesses in America, 
compared to only 7.1% for blacks.  However, recent survey findings show that there is a strong 
demand among blacks to start their own businesses.  In a survey conducted by Gallup on high-
school students’ attitudes towards entrepreneurship, 75% of black high-school students stated 
that they wanted to start their own business in the future, compared to 68% of all other high-
school students (Kourlisky and Esfandiari, 1997).  Furthermore, a survey of working-age 
Americans found that blacks are 78 percent more likely to attempt to start new companies, even 
after controlling for demographic characteristics (Shane, 2008).   
If blacks are so interested in starting their own businesses, then why are there so few black 
entrepreneurs in America?  Some of the most common reasons that have been cited in the 
literature as to why blacks are less likely to start their own businesses are a lack of human 
capital, both in terms of the education and experience necessary to run a business, a lack of role 
models or family figures who own their own businesses, a lack of financial capital necessary to 
facilitate business formation or business success, or the lack of social networks to help one 
through the process of starting one’s own business.  For instance, Singh and Crump (2007) 
suggest that, since blacks with entrepreneurial intentions are more educated than those without 
entrepreneurial intensions, in order to improve the black self-employment rate, more focus 
toward improving the educational attainment of blacks is necessary.  Fairlie (1999) finds that, 
while educational attainment explains a small amount of the black-white gap in business 
formation, racial differences in asset levels and the probability of having a self-employed father 
account for a much larger share of the gap.  Furthermore, Fairlie and Robb (2007) observe that 
lack of work experience in a family business among blacks negatively affects the outcomes of 
                                                 
1 These tabulations are based on 2010 American Community Survey 3-year estimates for male and female self-
employed workers in own not incorporated business, as a percentage of the civilian employed population 16 years of 
age and over. 
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black-owned businesses.  Others cite lack of financial capital or lack of access to financial 
markets as reasons for such large gaps in black-white business formation and business success.   
Discrimination against blacks could cause or exacerbate many of these problems facing 
aspiring black entrepreneurs.  Due to discrimination in wage employment, blacks are likely to 
have lower asset levels than whites (Charles and Guryan 2008).  Blacks facing discrimination 
also may have larger challenges securing business loans or outside investments in their 
companies (Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken 2002; Blanchflower et al 2003; Cavalluzzo and 
Wolken 2005; Coleman 2008).  They are less likely to get an education equal in quality to whites 
or be able to move into managerial positions to earn the experience necessary for entrepreneurial 
success (Card and Krueger 1992; Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard 2011).  Furthermore, this 
discrimination may lead to intergenerational effects and lower-quality social networks (Lentz 
and Laband 1990; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Hout and Rosen 2000; Fairlie and Robb 2007).  
However, no previous empirical studies have explored the relationship between discrimination 
towards blacks and the black-white self-employment rate gap.  This paper explores that 
relationship, and provides the first direct empirical evidence that discrimination negatively 
impacts black self-employment.   
There are a number of reasons why we should care whether discrimination is negatively 
affecting black self-employment.  Blacks are underrepresented in business ownership despite the 
strong demand among blacks to start their own businesses, and self-employment may provide a 
route for economic advancement among blacks when compared to opportunities in wage-
employment (Holtz-Eakin, Rosen, and Weathers 2000; Fairlie 2004a; Fairlie 2004b).  Moreover, 
many of the black individuals that fail to become self-employed as a result of discrimination 
come from the upper half of the skill distribution, and might be successful business owners in the 
absence of discrimination.  Furthermore, the government may be able to intervene to reverse the 
effect of discrimination if they can determine the mechanisms through which discrimination is 
most heavily impacting black self-employment.  
In this paper, I explore the relationship between discrimination towards blacks and the 
black-white self-employment rate gap by examining the effect that prejudicial attitudes towards 
blacks have on the black-white gap in self-employment.  While I cannot directly measure 
discrimination, as a proxy for discrimination, I construct a measure of prejudicial attitudes 
towards blacks using survey responses from the 1993-2010 General Social Survey Sensitive Data 
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Files.  These are restricted-access data files maintained by the Nation Opinion Research Center 
(NORC) at the University of Chicago and are obtained under special contractual arrangements.  
In each year, the survey includes an independently drawn sample of roughly 2,000-3,000 English 
or Spanish speaking persons 18 years of age or over, living in non-institutional arrangements 
within the United States.  The GSS contains demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal questions, 
plus topics of special interest, designed to take the “pulse of America.”  I use some of these 
questions to compile an index of the prejudicial attitudes of whites at the state level.  Then, I 
merge my index of the prejudicial attitudes of whites with the 2005-2009 American Community 
Survey (ACS) Public Use Microdata Sample, which contains detailed information about survey 
respondents.  To determine what impact the prejudicial attitudes of whites have on the black-
white self-employment rate gap, I estimate regressions of self-employment status, from the ACS, 
on the state-level index of prejudicial attitudes, controlling for the characteristics of individuals 
and states that could be correlated with both racial prejudice and with the black-white self-
employment rate gap. 
I find that a one standard deviation increase in the average prejudice of whites increases the 
black-white self-employment rate gap by between 0.58-0.83 percentage points, and these results 
are statistically significant at the 5% level.  An amount of prejudice equivalent to the difference 
in the least prejudiced and most prejudiced census divisions causes the black-white self-
employment rate gap to widen by between 1.35-1.93 percentage points.  These estimates 
translate into increases in the black-white self-employment rate gap of 24.2%-34.5%.  
Additionally, I find that the effect of an increase in average white prejudice on the black-white 
self-employment rate gap is due almost entirely to a decrease in the black self-employment rate, 
not an increase in the white self-employment rate.  I show that these results are robust to various 
model and data assumptions.    
Additionally, I test whether an increase in average white prejudice widens the black-white 
self-employment income gap.  I find no evidence of a relationship between the average prejudice 
of whites at the state-level and the black-white self-employment income gap.  Thus, while 
prejudice impacts whether blacks become self-employed, once they are self-employed it does not 
have an effect on their income.   
I also investigate the mechanisms through which prejudice is impacting the black-white self-
employment rate gap.   Specifically, I consider the role that customer discrimination and 
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financial constraints play in driving the effect of prejudice on the black-white self-employment 
rate gap.  I find suggestive evidence that discrimination is causing blacks to have more difficulty 
financing their businesses, and that customer discrimination may be playing some smaller role, 
however these results are mostly inconclusive due to imprecision in the estimates.   
Finally, I examine whether prejudice has a stronger effect on the black-white self-
employment rate in certain parts of the ability distribution.  I find suggestive evidence that the 
effect of prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate gap is most heavily concentrated in 
the 4th quintile of the ability distribution, and least heavily concentrated in the 1st quintile.  
Again, these results are mostly inconclusive because the estimates are imprecise.   
In this paper, I explore the relationship between discrimination towards blacks and the 
black-white self-employment rate gap, and provide the first direct empirical evidence that 
discrimination negatively impacts black self-employment.  However, I find no evidence of an 
effect on income among self-employed blacks.  I find evidence that suggests that discrimination 
causes increased difficulty for black entrepreneurs in acquiring business financing, and that 
customer discrimination may be playing some smaller role.  I also find suggestive evidence that 
discrimination has the largest effect on self-employment in the 4th quintile of the ability 
distribution.    
The next section of this paper discusses some background information and reviews the 
related literature.  Section 1.3 describes the data.  Sections 1.4 and 1.5 explain the methodology I 
employ and the results that follow, respectively.  Section 1.6 concludes. 
 
1.2 Discussion and Related Literature 
My paper most closely relates to literature pertaining to the black-white self-employment 
rate gap, access to business capital, and lender discrimination.  This paper adds to the existing 
literature by providing empirical support for the role that discrimination plays in explaining why 
blacks are both less likely to start businesses and less likely to have business success.  While 
there is a sizable literature explaining this gap, no previous empirical studies have analyzed the 
relationship between discrimination towards blacks and the black-white self-employment rate 
gap.  Some previous studies have used discrimination as a possible explanation for their findings, 
but none have been able to empirically indentify how discrimination towards blacks affects black 
entrepreneurship.   
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Much of the previous literature on the black-white self-employment gap focuses on the role 
of racial demographic differences.  Racial differences in educational attainment (Singh and 
Crump 2007), asset levels (Fairlie 1999), the probability of having a self-employed father 
(Fairlie 1999; Hout and Rosen 2000), work experience in family businesses (Fairlie and Robb 
2007), and self-employment patterns in previous generations (Lentz and Laband 1990; Dunn and 
Holtz-Eakin 2000) are all cited as reasons for the black-white gap in self-employment.  However, 
each of these explanations for the black-white self-employment rate gap may be partially driven 
by discrimination.       
Others cite access to business capital as a prominent reason for why there are so few black 
entrepreneurs.  Bates (1997) finds that the startup capital of a new business is partially 
determined by the human capital of its owner, and since blacks have less human capital they also 
have less startup capital available for use in new businesses.  Fairlie and Robb (2008) report that 
black-owned businesses have much lower levels of startup capital than white-owned businesses, 
and these differences persist across industries.  Additionally, Robb, Fairlie, and Robinson (2009) 
show that blacks are much less likely to access external financial markets or to inject additional 
capital into their businesses in their companies’ early years.  Moreover, Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, 
and Wolken (2002), Blanchflower et al (2003), Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2005), and Coleman 
(2008) all find a measureable black-white gap in loan denial rates.  As with demographic 
differences, racial differences in human capital, startup capital, and access to external financial 
markets also may be driven in part by discrimination.   
Despite the vast amount of research that has been done on the black-white self-employment 
gap, no previous empirical studies have analyzed the relationship between discrimination 
towards blacks and the black-white self-employment rate gap.  This is a significant oversight in 
the literature, as discriminatory beliefs could be a primary driving force behind the factors that 
others have identified as being important in generating this gap.  In this paper, I focus on directly 
investigating the relationship between the black-white self-employment rate gap and 
discrimination towards blacks, as measured by prejudicial attitudes, in order to explore the 
potential role of this underlying mechanism. 
 
1.3 Data  
The data that I use primarily come from the 1993-2010 General Social Survey (GSS) 
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Sensitive Data Files and the 2005-2009 American Community Survey (ACS) Public Use 
Microdata Sample.   
 
1.3.1 General Social Survey Sensitive Data Files 
I use the GSS Sensitive Data Files to measure the extent of racial prejudice across states.                                                
This data contains state-level geographic identifiers and responses to demographic, behavioral, 
and attitudinal questions for each individual, and is obtained under special contractual 
arrangements with NORC.2 3  In each year, the survey utilizes an independently drawn sample of 
roughly 2,000-3,000 English or Spanish speaking persons 18 years of age or over, living in non-
institutional arrangements within the United States, using full-probability sampling.4  Therefore, 
the GSS is a repeated cross-sectional dataset, and each year is representative of the U.S. 
population.  While the GSS is not designed to be representative at the state level, Brace et al 
(2002) show that state samples obtained from the GSS are remarkably representative, and that 
representativeness improves by pooling additional years of the GSS because of the joint effects 
of adding more primary sampling units and more individual observations.  Representativeness 
can be improved further by adding additional decades, which correspond to different sampling 
frames (Brace et al 2002).  I therefore pool the 1993-2010 survey results to measure prejudicial 
attitudes across states.      
The GSS asks many questions that are particularly focused on determining white 
individuals’ attitudes towards blacks.5  However, many of these questions focus on issues that 
are less directly related to racial prejudice, such as government assistance towards blacks or 
affirmative action.  Including only those questions that one-dimensionally focus on attitudes 
towards blacks, I compile a racial prejudice index for each white individual in each state.  Table 
1.1 shows the years that each question was asked for those questions that are included in the 
racial prejudice index.  Using the racial prejudice index of each individual, I then estimate the 
average prejudice of whites towards blacks at the state level, pooling across the 1993-2010 
                                                 
2Some of the data used in this analysis are derived from Sensitive Data Files of the GSS, obtained under special 
contractual arrangements designed to protect the anonymity of respondents.  These data are not available from the 
author.  Persons interested in obtaining GSS Sensitive Data Files should contact the GSS at GSS@NORC.org. 
3The General Social Survey has been used in work by Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999), Hout and Rosen (2000), 
Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008), and Charles and Guryan (2008).   
4Spanish speakers were added starting in 2006. 
5For a complete list of questions that focus on whites attitudes towards blacks asked in the GSS from 1993-2010, see 
Appendix A. 
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surveys. 
To create a racial prejudice index for each white individual in the GSS, I use the method 
introduced by Charles and Guryan (2008).6  First, I make higher values correspond to more 
prejudiced answers.  For instance, for the question that asks each respondent for an opinion to the 
statement “White people have a right to keep Blacks out of their neighborhoods if they want to, 
and Blacks should respect that right,” I code a response of “Agree Strongly” as three points, a 
response of “Agree slightly” as two points, a response of “Disagree slightly” as one point, and a 
response of “Disagree strongly” as zero points.  I then normalize the response to each question 
by the overall mean and standard deviation in 1993, the first year of the analysis.7  I divide by the 
1993 value of the standard deviation so that the relative weight of a particular question does not 
change over time.    Formally, let	 	be respondent i’s response to question q in year t.  Then 
respondent i’s normalized response to question q in year t, call it	 , is given by 
 
      =	
	

	[	,
 ]
(	,
 ) .                                                    (1) 
 
Figure 1.1 shows how the normalized responses to each question have changed over time 
from 1993-2010.  While prejudice has generally fallen over time, there is some variance in this 
decline across questions.  For instance, while many more individuals state that they would vote 
for a qualified black candidate for president in 2010 than in 1993, the number of individuals that 
believe that blacks have less motivation, willpower, and in-born ability to learn has declined at a 
much slower rate. 
Once I have normalized the response to each question for each individual in each year, I 
                                                 
6 Where available, I use the same questions that Charles and Guryan (2008) use in creating my index, with a few 
notable exceptions.  I use two questions that ask “On the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than 
white people.  Do you think these differences are because most blacks have less in-born ability to learn?” and  
 “On the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people.  Do you think these differences 
are because most blacks just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty?”, while 
Charles and Guryan  (2008) exclude these questions from their analysis.  Moreover, they include the question “Irish, 
Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Do you believe blacks 
should do the same without special favors?”  I exclude this question, as it also focuses on views pertaining to the 
appropriate role of government and affirmative action.  Another notable difference in the index created by Charles 
and Guryan (2008) is that they use GSS waves from 1972-2004 and use 1977 as the base year in their analysis, 
while I use GSS waves from 1993-2010 to more accurately assess a measure of current prejudice.  In their index, 
they also use other questions which were no longer asked post-1991. 
7 Three of the questions were not asked in 1993.  For these questions, I normalize by the mean and standard 
deviation from the first year in which the question was asked. 
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then calculate the average of the normalized responses for each individual in year t.  Formally, 
let  = ∑ ⁄ , where  is the total number of prejudice questions in year t.  I then estimate 
a regression of   on individual year fixed effects to find the residual	  , which I will 
henceforth refer to as the individual-level prejudice index.  I use this method to control for the 
fact that, while discrimination may be decreasing over time, the sample size from each state is 
changing over time as well, and I wish to separate the state-specific component of the individual-
level prejudice index from the time-specific component.8  Table 1.2 shows the pairwise 
correlations between each of the normalized individual-level prejudice questions, and the 
pairwise correlations between each of the normalized questions and the individual-level 
prejudice index.  All of the prejudice questions are positively correlated, and most are highly 
correlated with other prejudice questions and with the individual-level prejudice index.   
Using the individual-level prejudice index and the standardized responses to each question, I 
estimate a regression of each outcome on age, years of education, and an indicator variable for 
male, as well as state and year fixed effects, to determine how prejudice varies across the 
population; by conventional wisdom, older people, the less educated, and men tend to be more 
prejudiced.  Regressions describing the individual-level prejudice index and the standardized 
responses to each question are shown in Table 1.3.  On average, the individual-level prejudice 
index increases with age, decreases with education, and is larger for males.  I cannot reject that 
the same is true of the standardized responses to each question.  These results are consistent with 
Charles and Guryan (2008).  Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 provide confidence that the individual-level 
prejudice index is an accurate measure of prejudicial attitudes.   
Once I have obtained the individual-level prejudice index,  , for each individual, I then 
find the average of   in each state to create an index of the average prejudice of whites at the 
state level.  To do this, I weight by the number of adults in the household of each individual, and 
I correct the weights for survey non-response where possible.9  This is done because the full-
probability GSS samples are designed to give each household an equal probability of inclusion in 
the sample, and each adult in the household then has an equal probability of inclusion in the 
survey.  Left unweighted, this would serve to under-represent individuals from large households 
                                                 
8 As a robustness check, I also include a specification that does not disentangle the state-specific and time-specific 
components of each individual-level prejudice index.  This does not qualitatively change my estimate of the effect of 
average white prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate gap.   
9 The GSS allows for an area non-response adjustment to the weights from 2004 to the present.   
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and over-represent individuals from small ones.10       
Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of prejudice across census divisions.  The East South 
Central division (AL, KY, MI, TN) is the most prejudiced, followed by the West South Central 
(AR, LA, OK, TX) and South Atlantic divisions (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV).  
The New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT), Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, NM, MN, UT, NV, 
WY), and Pacific divisions (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA) are the least prejudiced.11  These tabulations 
follow closely with conventional wisdom.  Figure 1.3 shows how prejudice has changed over 
time in each census division.  In the majority of census divisions, there is not much movement in 
the prejudice index over time.  It is important to note that fluctuations in the prejudice index over 
time might occur not only because prejudice is changing, but also because the mix of questions 
asked and the individuals sampled in each year also are changing.  Stability of the prejudice 
index within each census division over time further supports the use of the average state-level 
prejudice index over this time span.     
It is technically accurate that prejudicial attitudes do not necessarily imply discriminatory 
behavior.  However, since Charles and Guryan (2008) find evidence that an increase in the 
prejudicial attitudes of whites increases the black-white wage gap, which implies that whites are 
acting upon these attitudes, I will henceforth ignore the distinction. 
    
1.3.2 American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample 
The ACS is a cross-sectional dataset that gathers detailed information from survey 
respondents annually. I make use of information about each respondent’s location, sex, race, age, 
educational attainment, self-employment status, self-employment income, industry, occupation, 
and other demographic characteristics.  While the GSS contains similar information about each 
respondent, I use the ACS to study self-employment outcomes due to the scope of the survey; the 
GSS samples 2,000-3,000 persons each year, approximately half of whom are males, but I am 
able to observe over 3 million males in a five year period with the ACS. 
Using the ACS, I define someone as self-employed if he reports being self-employed with a 
job at the time of the survey, and not self-employed if he reports being wage-employed or 
                                                 
10 As a robustness check, I include a specification where I create the state-level prejudice index using unweighted 
GSS data.  The use of weights has no substantive impact on the estimate of the effect of average white prejudice on 
the black-white self-employment rate gap.   
11 Based on the contractual arrangements with NORC, the census division is the finest level of geography at which I 
am permitted to display statistics from the GSS Sensitive Data Files.   
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unemployed at the time of the survey.  In my basic definition of self-employment, I exclude 
those individuals who report being out of the labor force.  However, as a robustness check, I use 
an alternative definition of self-employment that defines these individuals as not being self-
employed.  This does not qualitatively change my results.     
Table 1.4 shows summary statistics for the full sample of males age 18-64 and for 
subsamples of males age 18-64 separated by race and self-employment status.12  In this study I 
focus on the self-employment decisions of males since female labor supply decisions are 
typically both more complex than and dissimilar to male labor supply decisions.  Furthermore, it 
has been found in the literature that females are generally much less interested in self-
employment than males (Pryor and Reedy, 2009).  Approximately 11.4% of the individuals in 
the sample are self-employed at the time of the survey.  Those that are self-employed have more 
years of experience, are more likely to have a college degree, are more likely to be U.S. citizens, 
are more likely to be immigrants, are more likely to be married, are less likely to be black, and 
are less likely to be military veterans.  Among the self-employed, blacks have fewer years of 
experience, are less likely to have a college degree, are less likely to be U.S. citizens, are more 
likely to be immigrants, are less likely to be married, are more likely to be military veterans, and 
are less likely to speak English poorly than whites.13   
 
1.4 Methodology  
In this paper, I seek to identify the effect that racial prejudice has on the self-employment 
rate gap between blacks and whites using a time-invariant measure of racial prejudice that varies 
at the state level.  Ordinarily, to identify this effect, one would estimate a regression of whether 
an individual is self-employed on an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if an individual is black, 
the average prejudice of whites at the state level, and an interaction term between the two, 
controlling for the characteristics of individuals and states that could be correlated with both 
racial prejudice and with the black-white self-employment rate gap.  Because of the complex 
sampling design of the American Community Survey, the appropriate standard errors should use 
a repeated replication method utilizing the replicate weights contained therein (U.S. Census 
                                                 
12 Experience is defined as max(age-years of education-6, 0). 
13 Hispanic blacks and Hispanic whites are included in counts for blacks and whites, respectively.  As a robustness 
check, I include a specification which excludes all individuals of Hispanic origin.  This does not qualitatively change 
my estimate of the effect of average white prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate gap. 
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Bureau, 2009).14  Since I have merged each individual observation in the ACS with state-level 
data, the standard errors should be clustered at the state level as well.  This would indicate that 
either using repeated replication with the ACS replicate weights alone or clustering the standard 
errors at the state level alone will not retrieve the appropriate standard errors, and there is no 
method that allows one to do both simultaneously.  To circumvent this problem, I use a two-step 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimation method proposed by Hanushek (1974) and 
used by Borjas (1982) and Lewis and Linzer (2005).  
In the first step, I estimate a regression of whether an individual is self-employed on each of 
his individual-level characteristics separately for each state:   
 
                           ( ! = 1) = #($% + $'!()*+,! + $-!.! + /!),                               (2) 
 
where  ! is equal to 1 if individual i in state s is self-employed, ()*+,! is an individual-specific 
indicator variable equal to one if individual i in state s is black and equal to zero if individual i in 
state s is white, .! is a vector of individual-specific characteristics, and /! is an error term.  For 
each individual, I control for the set of demographic characteristics shown in Table 1.4, as well 
as a quadratic in potential labor market experience.  When f is a linear function, $'! is the state-
specific black-white self-employment rate gap controlling for individual-level characteristics.  
Since each of these regressions include only individual-level characteristics, standard errors can 
be correctly estimated by repeated replication making use of the ACS replicate weights. 
To identify the effect that racial prejudice has on the black-white self-employment rate gap, 
in the second step I estimate a regression of the state-specific black-white self-employment rate 
gap on the state-level prejudice index.  Specifically, I estimate  
 
                                          $'!0 =	1%	+	1'234! 	+ 	1-5! 	+ 	6! ,                                         (3) 
 
                                                 
14 Standard errors estimate the variation in a statistic across multiple samples of a given population, and the true 
standard error of any characteristic calculated from a single sample can never be known with certainty.  Replicate 
weights allow a single sample to simulate multiple samples and generate more informed standard error estimates 
that retain all of the information about the complex sampling design of the ACS (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).  There 
are 80 separate replicate weights in the ACS that allow researchers to derive standard error estimates empirically 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).    The standard error of an estimate using replicate weights in the ACS can be 
calculated using the formula 78(9) = 4/80∑ (9 − 9)-?%@' , where 9 is the estimate using the full-sample weight 
and 9 is the estimate from the analysis using the rth set of replicate weights (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). 
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where $'!0  is the predicted state-specific black-white self-employment rate gap controlling for 
individual-level characteristics that is taken from the estimation of equation (2), 234!	is an 
index of the average prejudice in state s, 5! 	is a vector of state-level characteristics, and 6! is the 
state-level error term.  For each state, I control for the natural log of the fraction of the 
population that is black, the natural log of the population, the average amount of contact in wage 
employment for males, the fraction of the black male population and the white male population 
that has a high school diploma, and the fraction of the black male population and the white male 
population that had a self-employed father present as a child.15  The natural log of the fraction of 
the population that is black, the natural log of the population, the fraction of the black male 
population that has a high school diploma, and the fraction of the white male population that has 
a high school diploma are calculated by summing over the relevant subpopulations in the ACS.  
To determine the fraction of the black male population and the white male population that had a 
self-employed father present as a child, I use a GSS question that asks “Was your father 
normally self-employed or did he work for someone else while you were growing up?” and then 
sum over the relevant subpopulations. 
To determine the average amount of customer contact in wage employment for males in 
each state, I use the Occupational Information Network (O*NET).  O*NET is administered by 
the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL/ETA), 
and is the nation’s primary source for occupational information.  O*NET indexes abilities, 
interests, knowledge, skills, activities, context, and values specific to each occupation in their 
database.  I use an index of the importance of ‘Working directly with the Public’ as a measure of 
the amount of customer contact in each occupation.  This index ranges from an importance of 98 
for public address announcers and sheriffs to an importance of 0 for mathematical technicians.  I 
match the amount of customer contact in each occupation to each male worker in the ACS by the 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) given in both datasets and then estimate the average 
amount of customer contact in wage employment for males in each state.   
Identification of the coefficient 1' in equation (3) is based on the covariance between the 
                                                 
15The race-specific fraction of the male population that graduated from high school in each state may serve as a 
measure of the race-specific quality of schooling in that state.  It also may help to represent the race-specific quality 
of potential social networks in that state.  The race-specific fraction of the male population that had a self-employed 
father present as a child may serve as a proxy variable for the probability that an individual in each state had 
experience in a family business as a child.  It may also control for past race-specific self-employment rates in the 
case that past self-employment affects the current level of the average prejudice of whites in each state.      
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black-white self-employment rate gap controlling for individual-level characteristics and the 
index of the average prejudice of whites, controlling for all state-specific characteristics.  1' can 
be interpreted as the increase in the black-white self-employment rate gap brought about by a 
one standard deviation increase in average white prejudice, controlling for all individual and 
state-specific characteristics.   
Since the dependent variable in equation (3) is estimated, 6! can be decomposed into 
sampling error,	A!, and standard regression error, B!.  Weighting equation (3) by the inverse 
standard deviation of the error term, 1 (C- + D!-⁄ ), where C-=Var(B!) and D!-=Var(A!), will 
produce the most efficient parameter estimates.  Since C- is not observed, it must be estimated 
by feasible generalized least squares; D!- is approximated using the estimate of the sampling 
variance of $'!0  from equation (2).  Using FGLS, C- is approximated by estimating equation (3) 
by unweighted OLS.  From the unweighted OLS regression, I retrieve the residuals,	6E!.  Then, 
since equation (2) is estimated using a linear probability model, C- can be estimated by  
 
                                            CE- = ∑ FEG
HG ∑ IJ GHG KLMN′NO
PQN ′RNS
TU ,                                                (4) 
 
where 6E! is the residual for state s from the second-step unweighted OLS regression, DJ!- is the 
estimated sampling variance of $E'!, . is the matrix of state-level independent variables, V is the 
diagonal matrix with D!- as the diagonal elements, S is the number of states, and k is the number 
of state-level independent variables including the constant.  Equation (3) is then re-estimated, 
weighted by	1 (CE- + DJ!-⁄ ). 
One detail that is often overlooked in related studies is that, since the state-level prejudice 
index is an estimated regressor from a relatively small sample, as are the other regressors that 
come from the GSS, standard errors that do not account for this variability will likely be biased 
downward.16  To correct for the imprecision in the estimated regressors that come from the GSS, 
I bootstrap the standard errors, stratifying on GSS year and primary sampling unit.17 18  
                                                 
16 While regressors from the ACS are also estimated, the ACS sample is more than one hundred times larger than the 
GSS sample.  Failure to account for the estimation of regressors from the ACS should have no substantial impact on 
the standard errors.   
17 Each bootstrapped standard error is calculated using 1000 replications.   
18 In some specifications, ordinary heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors may be biased downward by over 25%, 
highlighting the importance of accounting for imprecision in the regressors.   
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1.5 Results 
I estimate the model using the two-step FGLS procedure discussed in Section 1.4.  The 
distribution of the state-level black-white self-employment rate gap controlling for individual-
level characteristics is shown in Figure 1.4.  The estimates in Figure 1.4 can be directly 
compared to those in Figure 1.2.  In terms of the magnitude of the black-white self-employment 
rate gap controlling for individual-level characteristics, the Pacific, which is the least prejudiced 
census division, has four out of its five states in the lowest twenty; on the other hand, the East 
South Central, which is the most prejudiced, has only one.     
The results from the estimation of equation (3) are shown in Table 1.5.  If a coefficient in 
equation (3) is negative, this refers to a widening of the black-white self-employment rate gap, 
and if a coefficient is positive, this indicates a narrowing of the gap.  I add control variables 
across columns to illustrate the effect that the additional controls have on the estimate of the 
effect of average white prejudice.  A one standard deviation increase in average white prejudice 
at the state level widens the black-white self-employment rate gap by between 0.58-0.83 
percentage points, all else equal, depending on the specification, and these results are statistically 
significant at the 5% level in all specifications.  An amount of prejudice equivalent to the 
difference in the least prejudiced and most prejudiced census divisions causes the black-white 
self-employment rate gap to widen by between 1.35-1.93 percentage points.  Since the 
nationwide black-white self-employment rate gap controlling for observable characteristics is 
approximately 5.59 percentage points, this represents a 24.2%-34.5% increase. An increase in 
the average amount of customer contact in wage-employment also widens the black-white self-
employment rate gap, and this result is statistically significant at the 5% level.19  Sequentially 
adding additional control variables tends to have very little effect on the average white prejudice 
coefficient.20  
                                                 
19 I lack power when estimating state-level regressions which include interaction terms between each individual-
level characteristic and the black dummy variable.  However, when including these interaction terms in the first step, 
point estimates of the effect of a one standard deviation increase in average white prejudice on the black-white self-
employment rate gap are quantitatively similar to the results presented in Table 1.5.   
20 The results are robust to whether a linear probability model, probit regression, or logistic regression is estimated 
in the first step, and a linear probability model allows me to interpret the coefficients as average marginal effects; 
Appendix Table 1.B1, which displays the coefficients from the second step when the first step is a probit regression, 
shows that qualitatively similar conclusions can be drawn.  Borjas and Sueyoshi (1994) and Huber, Kernell, and 
Leoni (2005) show that this two-step procedure is possible when the first step is a non-linear model.  When the first-
step is estimated by a probit regression, each second-step regression is weighted by 1 (C- +D!-⁄ ), and C- is 
estimated by   CE- = ∑ ϵ̂G
HG ∑ IGHG
TU , where ϵ̂!is the residual for state s from a second-step unweighted OLS regression, 
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The results from Table 1.5 show that a one standard deviation increase in average white 
prejudice at the state level widens the black-white self-employment rate gap, however, they do 
not show whether or not the effect of a one standard deviation increase in average white 
prejudice at the state level lowers the self-employment rate of blacks.  To determine the effect of 
a one standard deviation increase in average white prejudice on the black self-employment rate, I 
first estimate the state-level black self-employment rate that is not due to observable 
characteristics.  Specifically, I estimate the linear probability model shown in equation (2) 
separately for each state, but with the black indicator variable omitted.  Then, to find the state-
level black self-employment rate that is not due to observable characteristics, I calculate the 
average residual from the first-step regression among blacks in each state.  Finally, I use the 
average residual, which represents the state-level black self-employment rate that is not due to 
observable characteristics, as the dependent variable in the second-step regression.   
The results from this second-step regression are shown in Table 1.6.  A one standard 
deviation increase in average white prejudice at the state level decreases the black self-
employment rate by between 0.62-0.75 percentage points, in specifications (2)-(6).  These results 
are statistically significant at the 5% level in specifications (2)-(5) and at the 10% level in 
specification (6).  Specifications (2)-(6) of Table 1.5 show that a one standard deviation increase 
in average white prejudice at the state level widens the black-white self-employment rate gap by 
between 0.63-0.83 percentage points.  Therefore, the impact of an increase in average white 
prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate gap is due almost entirely to a decrease in the 
black self-employment rate, not an increase in the white self-employment rate.  Sensibly, an 
increase in prejudice against blacks should cause black self-employment to decline while having 
little effect on white self-employment.   
It is of some concern that unobservable individual-level characteristics may be able to 
explain a large portion of the black-white self-employment rate gap that I have attributed to 
discrimination.  It also is of some concern that individuals will react endogenously to observed 
discrimination; for example, in the presence of discrimination, blacks might acquire less 
education because they no longer plan to start a business.  To provide evidence on these potential 
sources of bias, I show that observable characteristics of individuals are uncorrelated with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
D!- is the estimated sampling variance of $'!, S is the number of states, and k is the number of state-level 
independent variables including the constant.  The resultant coefficients in the second-step regression can be 
interpreted in the same way as coefficients from a probit regression.       
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average prejudice of whites in each state.  If observable characteristics of individuals are 
uncorrelated with the average prejudice of whites, then unobservable characteristics of 
individuals can only be correlated with the average prejudice of whites if they are uncorrelated 
with the observable characteristics of individuals; furthermore, it would rule out that blacks are 
reacting endogenously to discrimination by changing their observable characteristics.   
At the individual level, education, experience, citizenship, immigration, and marriage are 
positively correlated with self-employment, while military experience and poor English speech 
are negatively correlated with self-employment.  To determine whether observable individual-
level characteristics are correlated with the average prejudice of whites, I calculate the state-level 
black-white gap in each characteristic of interest, and then estimate a bivariate regression of each 
state-level gap on the average prejudice of whites.  Of particular interest is whether observable 
individual-level characteristics other than race predict a self-employment rate gap that is 
correlated with the average prejudice of whites.  These results are shown in Column (1) of Table 
1.7.  Together, all of these characteristics imply an increase in the black-white self-employment 
rate gap of 0.04 percentage points for every one standard deviation increase in average white 
prejudice, and this result is not statistically significant.  Since the combination of observable 
characteristics that predict self-employment is uncorrelated with the average prejudice of whites, 
it is unlikely that unobservable characteristics are able to account for the black-white self-
employment rate gap that is brought about by the average prejudice of whites, or that blacks are 
reacting endogenously to prejudice by altering their behavior.   
An increase in average white prejudice widens the black-white self-employment rate gap.  It 
is worth asking whether an increase in average white prejudice also widens the black-white self-
employment income gap.  Prejudice may directly impact the self-employment income of blacks 
through higher-interest business loans or discrimination from suppliers or consumers; however, 
since prejudice widens the black-white self-employment rate gap, it also may affect which blacks 
become or remain self-employed.  If average white prejudice widens the black-white self-
employment rate gap by making it more difficult for blacks to finance their businesses, then 
blacks that become or remain self-employed in more prejudiced states will likely be more highly 
skilled than blacks in less prejudiced states.  This might cause estimates of the effect of average 
white prejudice on the black-white self-employment income gap to be biased toward narrowing 
the gap, since I cannot control for unobserved individual characteristics.  To provide evidence 
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that unobservable individual-level characteristics of self-employed individuals are uncorrelated 
with the average prejudice of whites, I show that observable characteristics of the self-employed 
are uncorrelated with the average prejudice of whites in each state.   
To determine whether observable characteristics of self-employed individuals are correlated 
with prejudice levels, I calculate the state-level black-white gap in each characteristic of interest 
among the self-employed, and then estimate a bivariate regression of each state-level gap on the 
average prejudice of whites.  These results are shown in Column (2) of Table 1.7.  Based on 
observable characteristics, there is no statistically significant evidence that self-employed blacks 
are more highly skilled in more prejudiced states than less prejudiced states when compared to 
the self-employed whites in those states. Thus, it is unlikely that self-employed blacks are more 
highly skilled in more prejudiced states than less prejudiced states when compared to the self-
employed whites in those states, based on unobservable characteristics. 
To estimate the effect of an increase in average white prejudice on the black-white self-
employment income gap, I again use the two-step FGLS procedure discussed in Section 1.4.  I 
use the natural log of self-employment income as the dependent variable in the first-step 
regressions.21  The results from the second-step regressions are shown in Columns (1)-(3) of 
Table 1.8.  There is no statistically significant relationship between the average prejudice of 
whites at the state-level and the black-white self-employment income gap.22  Since some self-
employed workers may pay themselves a wage or salary that should actually be reported as self-
employment income, I also estimate the regressions using the natural log of self-employment 
income plus wage and salary income for all self-employed workers as the dependent variable in 
the first-step regressions.  The results from these second-step regressions are shown in Columns 
(4)-(6) of Table 1.8 and are not qualitatively different from the results in Columns (1)-(3).   
As previously mentioned, estimates of the effect of average white prejudice on the black-
white self-employment income gap are biased toward narrowing the gap if the black individuals 
that become or remain self-employed in more prejudiced states are unobservably more highly 
                                                 
21 In the regressions I exclude all self-employed workers with self-employment income less than or equal to zero.  
This includes only 1.12% of self-employed blacks and 1.21% of self-employed whites.  The mean self-employment 
income of blacks with self-employment income below zero is similar to the mean self-employment income of whites 
with self-employment income below zero.   
22 Using the subset of self-employed workers who have greater self-employment income than wage and salary 
income, or who have no wage or salary income, does not qualitatively change the results.   
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skilled than blacks in less prejudiced states.23  It is not clear if there is no effect of an increase in 
average white prejudice on the black-white self-employment income gap, or if I fail to find an 
effect because the black individuals that are observed as self-employed in more prejudiced states 
are more highly skilled than blacks in less prejudiced states in some unobservable way.  
However, based on Column (2) of Table 1.7, it is unlikely that the black individuals that are 
observed as self-employed in more prejudiced states are unobservably more highly skilled than 
blacks in less prejudiced states. 
     
1.5.1 Role for Customer Discrimination and Business Financing  
I have not yet addressed the potential reasons why an increase in average white prejudice 
widens the black-white self-employment rate gap.  One possible explanation could be that a 
higher level of prejudice among whites widens the black-white self-employment rate gap 
because white customers discriminate against black-owned businesses.  In this case, 
discriminatory whites only would purchase from black-owned businesses at lower prices than 
white-owned businesses would charge for identical products, in order to compensate themselves 
for the disutility that they experience when purchasing from blacks (Becker 1957).  In order for 
customer discrimination to exist, there must be contact between customers and the group that is 
discriminated against. 
I define an individual as being self-employed in a high contact occupation if they are self-
employed in an occupation where the importance of ‘Working directly with the Public’ is above 
the median level, and I define an individual as not being self-employed in a high contact 
occupation if they are not self-employed, or if they are self-employed in an occupation where the 
importance of ‘Working directly with the Public’ is below the median level.  I use an analogous 
definition for self-employment in a low contact occupation.24   
To test whether the average prejudice of whites has a greater effect on the black-white self-
employment rate gap in occupations with large amounts of customer contact than in occupations 
with small amounts of customer contact, I use the two-step FGLS procedure discussed in Section 
                                                 
23 If the black individuals that become or remain self-employed in more prejudiced states are more highly skilled 
than blacks in less prejudiced states, but this skill difference is observable, then estimates of the effect of average 
white prejudice on the black-white self-employment income gap are not biased.  They are only biased if this skill 
difference is unobservable.     
24 The median level of the index of the importance of ‘Working directly with the Public’ is 49.86.  The mean of the 
index is 50.21. 
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1.4 separately for high contact and low contact occupations.  Table 1.9 shows the results from 
the second-step regressions: a one standard deviation increase in average white prejudice at the 
state level is shown to widen the black-white self-employment rate gap in high contact 
occupations by between 0.36-0.48 percentage points, and these results are statistically significant 
at the 5% level.  A one standard deviation increase in average white prejudice at the state level 
widens the black-white self-employment rate gap in low contact occupations by between 0.32-
0.38 percentage points, and these results are only statistically significant (at the 10% level) when 
the race-specific graduation rates and the race-specific fractions with a self-employed father 
present as a child are not included.  In comparable specifications, the estimate of the effect of 
prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate gap in low contact occupations is not 
statistically distinguishable from the effect of prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate 
gap in high contact occupations, and is between 76%-88% as large in magnitude.  While there 
may be a small effect caused by customer discrimination, it is not a primary driver of the results.   
Another potential explanation why an increase in the average prejudice of whites widens the 
black-white self-employment rate gap is that a more prejudiced environment makes it more 
difficult for blacks to finance their businesses.  One implication of financial market 
discrimination is that prejudice would have a greater effect on the black-white self-employment 
rate gap in industries that require a large amount of startup capital.  To this end, I estimate the 
average startup cost of a firm in each industry that corresponds to a two-digit NAICS code.  To 
do this, I use the 2007 Survey of Business Owners, which reports the percent of firms in each 
industry that had startup costs of less than $5,000, $5,000 to $9,999, $10,000 to $24,999, 
$25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $249,999, $250,000 to $999,999, or 
$1,000,000 or more.  The survey also allows for an answer of don’t know or not applicable.  I 
estimate the average startup cost of a firm in each industry using the mid-point of each range and 
1.5 times the top-code, under the assumptions that not applicable means that no startup capital 
was necessary and the average startup capital of those who did not know their business’ startup 
cost is the same as those who did know their business’ startup cost.  Then, I divide the ACS 
sample of firms into two groups by classifying each industry as a high startup cost industry or 
low startup cost industry.  Detailed information about the estimation of average startup costs in 
each industry can be found in Appendix Table 1.B2.   
The race-specific percent of the labor force that is self-employed in each industry is shown 
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in Figure 1.5.  The industries that I have identified as low startup cost industries (educational 
services, services, administrative services, professional services, and construction) contain 53.9% 
of all self-employed workers, and self-employed workers in each of these industries make up a 
relatively large fraction of the labor force for both blacks and whites, with educational services 
being the exception.  The largest black-white gaps in self-employment are in the construction 
and professional services industries.  While the number of self-employed workers in high startup 
cost industries is relatively lower, there tends to be a significant gap in each of these industries, 
except for transportation.  Among high startup cost industries, agriculture has the largest black-
white gap in self-employment.25   
To test whether the average prejudice of whites has a greater effect on the black-white self-
employment rate gap in industries with high startup costs than in industries with low startup 
costs, I use the two-step FGLS procedure discussed in Section 1.4 separately by industry startup 
cost; Table 1.10 shows the results from the second-step regressions.  A one standard deviation 
increase in average white prejudice at the state level is shown to widen the black-white self-
employment rate gap in high startup cost industries by 0.40 percentage points in the full 
specification shown in Column (3).  This result is statistically significant at the 10% level.  A one 
standard deviation increase in average white prejudice at the state level increases the black-white 
self-employment rate gap in low startup cost industries by only 0.26 percentage points in the full 
specification, and this result is not statistically significant.  Since the magnitude of the effect is 
much smaller in low startup cost industries, this may be evidence that average white prejudice 
has a much smaller effect on the black-white self-employment rate gap in industries with low 
startup costs.  This assertion can be strengthened by the fact that 54% of self-employed workers 
are in industries that I classify as high startup cost industries and 46% are in industries that I 
classify as low startup cost industries, because the sample could not be split evenly based on 
two-digit NAICS industries; due to this feature of the data, the coefficients for high startup cost 
industries are biased downward, and the coefficients for low startup cost industries are biased 
upward.  Prejudice could have a smaller effect in low startup cost industries either because 
blacks in more prejudiced states have more difficulty acquiring external financing from lenders 
or investors or because blacks in more prejudiced states have lower wage earnings to use toward 
                                                 
25 In section 1.5.3, I do a robustness check of my initial results excluding agriculture, and find no substantive 
difference in my results.    
 21 
 
financing their own businesses, as found by Charles and Guryan (2008).  Nevertheless, in each 
specification, the estimate of the effect of prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate gap 
in low startup cost industries is not statistically distinguishable from the effect in high startup 
cost industries due to the relatively small number of states in my sample. 
I find evidence that suggests that discrimination causes increased difficulty for black 
entrepreneurs in acquiring business financing, and that customer discrimination may be playing 
some smaller role.  However, the results are mostly inconclusive due to the size of the standard 
errors.   
 
1.5.2 Heterogeneous Effects Across the Distribution of Ability 
The effect of prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate gap is likely concentrated 
among those black workers that are most likely to try to become self-employed.  Individuals with 
bachelor’s or graduate degrees, those that are married, and immigrants are much more likely to 
enter into self-employment, and are thus susceptible to discrimination that may keep them from 
becoming self-employed.  Those that would never attempt to enter self-employment in the 
absence of discrimination cannot be prevented from becoming self-employed by discrimination.   
To determine how the effect of prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate gap 
varies across the distribution of ability, I first create an index of ability.  To generate this index, I 
estimate a regression of the natural log of wage income on all of the individual-level 
demographic characteristics present in .! in equation (2), separately for each state, using only 
the wage-employed.  Then, in each state, I calculate the predicted value from this regression for 
each worker in the labor market; this is an estimate of the log wage for each individual given his 
observable characteristics.26  I use this index to rank workers based on ability.   
In each state, I divide each worker into an ability quintile based on his predicted log wage.  
While only 3.97% in the lowest ability quintile are self-employed, 16.4% are self-employed in 
the highest ability quintile, and the self-employment rate increases monotonically across 
quintiles.  Thus, the effect of prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate gap is probably 
most heavily concentrated in the upper tail of the ability distribution.   
                                                 
26Of course, the coefficients from this regression may be biased because I only observe wages for the wage-
employed; self-employed and unemployed individuals are omitted from the regression.  Nonetheless, the predicted 
value from this regression will give a fairly accurate representation of each person’s relative position in the ability 
distribution.    
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I use the two-step FGLS procedure discussed in Section 1.4 separately by quintile; Table 
1.11 shows the results from the second-step regressions.  The magnitude of the effect of average 
white prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate gap is largest in the 4th quintile of the 
ability distribution, and is statistically significant at the 5% level.  However, while the effects in 
the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th quintiles are approximately one-third to one-half the size of the effect in the 
4th quintile and not statistically significant, and the effect in the lowest quintile is less than one-
tenth the size of the effect in the 4th quintile and not statistically significant, none of the 
differences are statistically significant either due to imprecision in the estimates.  However, 
evidence suggests that the effect of prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate gap is 
most concentrated in the 4th quintile of the ability distribution, and least concentrated in the 1st 
quintile.   
Theoretically, it should not be surprising if prejudice most heavily affects self-employment 
in the 4th quintile of the ability distribution.  While the prevalence of self-employment is highest 
in the 5th quintile, individuals in the 5th quintile are those that financial institutions or employers 
would have the most difficult time discriminating against due to their credentials.  A loan officer 
would likely have a hard time explaining why she didn’t give a loan to a black client with an 
MBA and 25 years of labor market experience, but gave one to a white client with 10 fewer 
years of experience and only a bachelor’s degree.   
While I find evidence that suggests that the effect of prejudice on the black-white self-
employment rate gap is most heavily concentrated in the 4th quintile of the ability distribution, 
and least heavily concentrated in the 1st quintile, the results are mostly inconclusive due to the 
size of the standard errors.   
 
1.5.3 Robustness Checks 
I estimate a series of robustness checks to determine if the effect that racial prejudice has on 
the black-white self-employment rate gap is robust to various model and data assumptions.  The 
results from these regressions are shown in Tables 1.12a and 1.12b.  Column (1) of Table 1.12a 
shows the specification from Column (6) of Table 1.5 for the sake of comparison.  To determine 
if the result is a byproduct of the weighting scheme that I employ, in Column (2), I estimate the 
second-step regression by unweighted ordinary least squares, and in Column (3), I estimate the 
second-step regression by weighting each state by the inverse of the standard error of the 
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dependent variable that comes from the first-step regression.  In both cases the estimate of the 
effect of average white prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate gap is very similar to 
the estimate that uses FGLS weights.  In Column (4), I use an alternative definition of self-
employment that includes all individuals not in the labor force as not self-employed.  This might 
affect the initial estimates if some individuals drop out of the labor force when they fail to 
become self-employed, and if it occurs more frequently for blacks in low prejudice states or for 
whites in high prejudice states.  This attenuates the estimate; however, the attenuation is a 
product of the alternative definition of self-employment; under the alternative definition 18% 
fewer individuals are defined as self-employed, and the self-employment rate gap is 9.3% 
smaller.  
In Column (5), I calculate the average prejudice of whites at the state level without 
reweighting each year to receive equal weight. In Column (6), I calculate the average prejudice 
of whites at the state level by not time-detrending prejudice at the individual level.  The 
adjustments in Columns (5) and (6) have little effect on the sign or magnitude of the estimates.  
In Column (7), I use a measure of average white prejudice that is calculated without weighting 
each respondent by the number of individuals in the household or correcting for survey non-
response.  In Column (8), I exclude all individuals of Hispanic origin, regardless of whether they 
are black or white.  In Column (9), I exclude all immigrants.  Each of the adjustments in 
Columns (7)–(9) has little effect on the sign or magnitude of the estimates.  
In Column (10), I present a specification that excludes agriculture from the first-step 
estimate of the black-white self-employment rate gap.  While this attenuates the estimate, 4.3% 
fewer workers are defined as self-employed when agriculture is excluded; the black-white self-
employment rate gap that excludes agriculture is also 9.3% smaller.  In Column (11), I time-
detrend the fraction of the black male population and the fraction of the white male population 
that had a self-employed father present as a child to control for the fact that, while the fraction 
that had a self-employed father present as a child may be changing over time, the sample size 
from each state is changing over time as well.  This also has very little effect on the sign or 
magnitude of the estimate.  In Column (12), I include a measure of the fraction of blacks that are 
segregated from whites to control for the proximity of blacks and whites.  While the inclusion of 
the fraction of blacks that are segregated from whites increases the magnitude of the coefficient, 
it likely reacts endogenously to the average prejudice of whites.   
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In Columns (13) - (18), I check to see if the estimates are robust to particular functional 
form assumptions in the model.  In Column (13), I allow the population and the fraction of the 
population that is black to enter the second-step regression linearly.  In Column (14), I omit the 
natural log of the fraction of the population that is black.  This would be appropriate if the 
fraction of the population that is black were endogenously determined.  In Column (15), I 
include a quadratic function of both the fraction of the black male population and the fraction of 
the white male population with a high school diploma, in the case that increases in the fraction 
with a high school diploma may at some point signal a declining quality of schooling or a lower 
quality social network if it is particularly easy to obtain a high school diploma.  In Column (16), 
I include a quadratic function of both the fraction of the black male population and the fraction 
of the white male population with a college degree, in the case that the fraction with a college 
degree is a better measure of the quality of schooling or quality of social network than the 
fraction with a high school diploma.  In Column (17), in order to allow for a flexible functional 
form for the fraction of the population that is black, I control for a fourth-degree polynomial in 
the fraction of the population that is black.  In Column (18), in order to allow for a flexible 
functional form for the fraction of the black male population and the fraction of the white male 
population that had a self-employed father present as a child, I control for a quartic in the 
fraction of the black male population and the fraction of the white male population that had a 
self-employed father present as a child.  Each of these functional form assumptions has little 
effect on the sign or magnitude of the estimates.27  In Column (19), I test whether average white 
prejudice, as measured by the GSS prejudice questions that specifically ask about feelings 
towards blacks, has an effect on the Hispanic-white self-employment rate gap.  The measure of 
average white prejudice towards blacks should have a much smaller impact on the self-
employment rate of Hispanics, although it may still have a negative impact since discrimination 
against blacks and discrimination against Hispanics may be correlated.  I estimate this 
falsification test using only white Hispanics to avoid allowing black Hispanics to bias the results, 
since prejudice clearly impacts black self-employment.  The estimate is positive and statistically 
                                                 
27 I also run eleven additional robustness checks where I leave one question at a time out of the prejudice index, 
using the specification from Table 1.5, Column (6).  The coefficients on Average White Prejudice range from  
-0.00496 to -0.00757, and all are statistically significant at the 10% level, except for the one where I leave out the 
question which asks “On the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people.  Do you think 
these differences are because most blacks just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of 
poverty?” 
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insignificant, which lends additional credibility to my previous results.       
 
1.6 Conclusion  
In this paper, I examine the link between prejudicial attitudes towards blacks and the black-
white gap in self-employment.  I find that a one standard deviation increase in the average 
prejudice of whites increases the black-white self-employment rate gap by between 0.58-0.83 
percentage points.  An amount of prejudice equivalent to the difference in the least prejudiced 
and most prejudiced census divisions causes the black-white self-employment rate gap to widen 
by between 1.35-1.93 percentage points.  These estimates translate into increases in the black-
white self-employment rate gap of 24.2%-34.5%.  Additionally, I find that the effect of an 
increase in average white prejudice on the black-white self-employment rate gap is due almost 
entirely to a decrease in the black self-employment rate, not an increase in the white self-
employment rate.  It makes practical sense that an increase in prejudice against blacks would 
cause black self-employment to decline while having little effect on white self-employment.  
These results are robust to various model and data assumptions.    
There are several plausible explanations for these results.  Discrimination may exacerbate 
many of the problems facing potential black entrepreneurs.  Due to discrimination in wage 
employment, blacks are likely to have lower asset levels than whites.  Blacks facing 
discrimination also may have larger challenges securing business loans or outside investments in 
their companies.  They are less likely to get an education equal in quality to whites or be able to 
move into managerial positions to earn the experience necessary for entrepreneurial success.  
Furthermore, this discrimination may lead to intergenerational effects and lower-quality social 
networks.  Blacks in prejudiced states may face higher prices from distributors.  More prejudiced 
states may structure their laws and governing practices towards the advantage of whites, possibly 
without openly discriminating against blacks.  Furthermore, perceived discrimination may cause 
blacks to believe they would be unsuccessful in self-employment, or unsuccessful at obtaining 
business loans if they were to apply.  
This paper presents the first direct empirical evidence that discrimination towards blacks 
negatively impacts black self-employment.  Yet, I find no evidence of an effect of prejudice on 
black self-employment income.  My findings are consistent with prejudicial attitudes towards 
blacks leading to increased difficulty for black entrepreneurs in acquiring business financing, 
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with a potential smaller role for customer discrimination.  Future research might more closely 
examine the mechanisms through which discrimination is operating, verify whether 
discrimination against other minority groups, such as Hispanics, negatively impacts self-
employment amongst members of those groups, determine what impact racial prejudice against 
blacks plays in the market for mortgages or home-loans for blacks, or determine if perceived 
prejudice among blacks follows closely with the prejudicial attitudes of whites that are observed 
in this study.  
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Figure 1.1: How Answers to GSS Prejudice Questions Change over Time 
 
aResponses are standardized by the mean and standard deviation of the first year that each question is asked.   
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Figure 1.2:  The Average Prejudice Index across Census Divisions 
 
aThe error band on each bar represents the 95% confidence interval on the estimate of average prejudice in that 
census division. 
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Figure 1.3:  How the Average Prejudice Index has changed over Time across Census Divisions 
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Figure 1.4:  Distribution of the State Self-Employment Rate Gap, 
Controlling for Individual-Level Characteristics 
 
 
aBased on American Community Survey Public Use Microdata, 2005-2009 5-year estimates. 
bWithin each bar, higher states have larger gaps than those below it.   
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Figure 1.5:  Percent of Labor Force Self-Employed in Each Industry, by Race 
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Appendix 1.A. Questions from the General Social Survey, 1993-2010 
Questions I choose to use because they only deal only with a respondent’s views toward blacks: 
CLOSEBLK- In general, how close do you feel to blacks? [Very Close=0, 1, 2, 3, Neither one 
Feeling nor the Other=4, 5, 6, 7, Not at All Close=8] 
FEELBLKS- In general, how warm or cool do you feel towards blacks? [Very Warm=0, 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, Very Cool=8] 
RACCHNG- If you and your friends belonged to a social club that would not let blacks join, 
would you try to change the rules so that blacks could join? [Yes=0, No=1] 
RACDIF2- On the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people.  Do 
you think these differences are because most blacks have less in-born ability to learn? 
[No=0,Yes=1] 
RACDIF4- On the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people.  Do 
you think these differences are because most blacks just don't have the motivation or will power 
to pull themselves up out of poverty? [No=0,Yes=1] 
RACMAR-Do you think there should be laws against marriages between blacks and whites? 
[No=0,Yes=1] 
RACOPEN- Do you agree that a homeowner should be able to decide for himself whom to sell 
his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to blacks. [No=0, Maybe=1, Yes=2] 
RACPRES- If your party nominated a black for President, would you vote for him if he were 
qualified for the job? [Yes=0, No=1] 
RACPUSH- Do you agree that blacks shouldn’t push themselves where they’re not wanted? 
[Disagree strongly=0, Disagree slightly=1, Agree slightly=2, Agree strongly=3] 
RACSCHL (RACFEW/RACHAF/RACMOS)- Would you yourself have any objection to 
sending your children to a school where a few/half/most of the children are black? [No=0, Yes, 
but only if Most Black=1, Yes, but only if Half Black=2, Yes, if a Few Black=3] 
RACSEG- Do you agree that white people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods 
if they want to, and blacks should respect that right? [Disagree strongly=0, Disagree slightly=1, 
Agree slightly=2, Agree strongly=3] 
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Questions I choose not to use because they are less directly focused on prejudicial attitudes 
towards blacks: 
AFFRMACT- Do you favor preference in hiring? 
BUSING- In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/Black/African-American) and 
white school children from one school district to another? 
COLRAC- Consider a person who believes that blacks are genetically inferior.  Should such a 
person be allowed to teach in a college or university? 
LIBRAC- Consider a person who believes that blacks are genetically inferior.  If some people in 
your community suggested that a book he wrote which said Blacks are inferior should be taken 
out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not? 
HELPBLK- Do you believe the government should be obligated to help blacks? 
NATRACE- Are we spending too much on improving the condition of blacks? 
NATRACEY- Are we spending too much on assistance to blacks?  
RACDIF1- On the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people.  Do 
you think these differences are mainly due to discrimination? 
RACDIF3- On the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people.  Do 
you think these differences are because most blacks don't have the chance for education that it 
takes to rise out of poverty? 
SPKRAC- Consider a person who believes that blacks are genetically inferior.   If such a person 
wanted to make a speech in your community claiming that Blacks are inferior, should he be 
allowed to speak, or not?                                  
WRKWAYUP- Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked 
their way up. Do you believe blacks should do the same without special favors?  
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CHAPTER 2 
TAX AVOIDANCE: HOW INCOME TAX RATES AFFECT  
THE LABOR MIGRATION DECISIONS OF NBA FREE AGENTS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the summer of 2010, LeBron James had a decision to make about his NBA playing 
future.  In the week leading up to “the decision”, James met with representatives from six NBA 
teams: the New Jersey Nets, New York Knicks, Miami Heat, Los Angeles Clippers, Cleveland 
Cavaliers, and Chicago Bulls. In an hour long special which aired on July 8th, 2010 on ESPN, 
James chose to play the next five years of his career with the Miami Heat, a decision which is 
likely still being criticized by NBA analysts at the time of publication. 
According to many income tax experts, LeBron James made the right decision.  “If LeBron 
James goes to the Miami Heat instead of the Knicks, blame our dysfunctional lawmakers in 
Albany, who have saddled top-earning New Yorkers with the highest state and city income taxes 
in the nation, soon to be 12.85 percent on top of the IRS bite,” said the New York Post.  “On a 
five-year contract worth $96 million -- what he'd get from the Knicks or the Heat -- LeBron 
would pay $12.34 million in New York taxes (Gillis, 2010).”  Based on a similar contract, 
“James would pay $5.69 million in state taxes if he re-signed with the Cleveland Cavaliers.  If he 
signed with the New Jersey Nets, James would pay $10.32 million in state taxes (Gillis, 2010).”  
He would also pay $2.87 million more in state taxes if he signed with the Chicago Bulls as 
compared to the Miami Heat, and much more if he went to play for the L.A. Clippers in 
California, where the top income tax rate is 10.55% (Merchak, 2010).  According to agent Gregg 
Clifton of Octagon Sports who represents big-name baseball players such as Tom Glavine and 
David Wells, “…there’s a clear benefit to relocating to tax-free states (Heath, & Crenshaw, 
2003).” 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
While the causes and effects of labor migration are of central importance in the labor 
migration literature, little work has been done regarding the effects that changes in state and city 
income tax rates may have on the labor migration decisions of high income individuals.  This 
gap in the labor migration literature may be due to a lack of data availability.  Many data sources, 
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such as the March Current Population Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, top-
code or censor individuals whose income exceeds a certain amount.  In addition, these surveys 
contain only limited information about worker ability.  By using a dataset of professional 
basketball players’ free agent contracts from 2001-2007, I am able to circumvent both of these 
data limitations.   
Clark and Hunter (1992) find that working males in their peak earning years are detracted 
by high income taxes in migration decisions.  Wallace (1993, 2002) finds that income taxes are 
not always entirely borne by labor, and when income taxes are capitalized within wages, that 
they generally do not affect individual’s migration decisions.  However, it may be particularly 
useful to explore the effects that changes in income tax rates may have on the labor migration 
decisions of high income individuals, since high income individuals bear the largest burden of an 
income tax, especially when tax rates are progressive.  Kirchgassner and Pommerehne (1996) 
and Feld and Kirchgassner (2001) find that high income individuals in Switzerland, where local 
tax competition between cantons and cities is relatively high, seem to choose their location based 
on the amount of income taxes that they must pay.  However, their work does not estimate the 
causal effect of taxation, but rather notes a negative spatial correlation between cities and 
cantons with high income taxation and the location of high income individuals.  Egger and 
Radulescu (2009) find that personal income tax rates have a negative effect on cross-border 
flows of skilled workers in OECD countries.    
 
2.3 Taxes and the NBA 
The National Basketball Association’s regular season lasts from late-October until late-
April.  Approximately two-fifths of one season takes place at the end of one year, and three-fifths 
of the season takes place at the beginning of the next year.  Thus, two-fifths of the income tax 
paid by a player in a given season will be taxed in the first year of a season, and three-fifths of 
the income tax paid by a player in a given season will be taxed in the second year of a season.   
Each team in the National Basketball Association plays an eighty-two game regular season 
schedule.  Exactly forty-one of these games are “home games” which are played in the team’s 
home arena and are taxed by the team’s home state.  For the remaining forty-one “away games” 
which are played in their opponent’s arena, players generally must pay whichever tax rate is 
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higher, the home state’s or the away state’s (Merchak, 2010).28  Many teams also play in cities 
where there are city or county income taxes as well.  Of course, in the United States, state 
income tax is deductible from federal income tax.  In Canada, however, this is not the case; 
provincial income tax is not deductible from Canadian income tax.     
Under the collective bargaining agreement of the NBA there are two types of free agents: 
restricted free agents and unrestricted free agents.  A restricted free agent may entertain offers 
from any team; however the player’s current team reserves the right to match any offer in order 
to keep the player.   Any veteran free agent who will have three or fewer years of NBA service 
following the season in which his contract expires will become a restricted free agent if the 
player’s prior team makes a qualifying offer (the higher of 125% of his previous season’s salary 
or $175,000 plus the league minimum) to him.  An unrestricted free agent is a player who is not 
bound to any particular team, and is free to negotiate a contract with any team ("2005 Collective 
Bargaining Agreement," 2009). Unrestricted free agents include any veteran free agents with at 
least four years of service, any veteran free agents with three or fewer years of service that does 
not receive a qualifying offer from his prior team, and any undrafted rookies ("2005 Collective 
Bargaining Agreement," 2009).  Figure 2.1 shows the average salary of NBA players in each 
season between 2001 and 2007. 
There is a league-wide maximum salary which cannot be exceeded for a single player, and a 
salary cap which restricts the total amount of a team’s payroll.  While there are many exceptions 
to these restrictions which allow teams to exceed the salary cap, the most important of these 
exceptions fall into the “Larry Bird” family of exceptions.  These exceptions, which are named 
after the famous Boston Celtics forward Larry Bird, allow teams to exceed the salary cap by re-
signing their own free agents.  
Teams that exceed the salary cap by large amounts are punished with a luxury tax.  There is 
a strong incentive for teams to keep their payroll under the luxury tax threshold; for each dollar 
by which a team’s payroll exceeds the luxury tax threshold, the team must pay to the league one 
dollar, which is then dispersed evenly among the teams which have not exceeded the luxury tax 
                                                 
28 There are many tax law s which differ across different jurisdictions.  In the years covered by this analysis, athletes 
were not required to pay income tax when playing on the road at the Toronto Raptors or Washington Wizards.  
Taxes at the Chicago Bulls were strictly retaliatory.   Furthermore, athletes were not required to pay New York City 
taxes when playing at the New York Knicks.  City tax rates for Detroit, Philadelphia, and Indianapolis differ for 
residents and non-residents.  For away games, athletes that play for the Chicago Bulls are taxed 3% on top of the 
taxes that they pay to the away state.  For a more thorough description, see Hoffman and Hodge (2004). 
 55 
 
threshold ("2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement," 2009).29  Table 2.1 shows the top ten NBA 
payrolls for each season between 2001-2003 and 2007-2008.30 In the 2002-2003 season, in the 
first year of the luxury tax, more than half of the teams in the NBA were over the threshold.  
However, by 2005-2006 season, only one-sixth of the league had a payroll above the luxury tax 
threshold.  But, in recent seasons the number of teams with payroll above the luxury tax 
threshold has again increased.  In the 2007-2008 season, eleven teams had a payroll which 
exceeded the luxury tax threshold, and in the 2008-2009 season, thirteen teams had a payroll 
which exceeded the luxury tax threshold.  While many teams choose to exceed the salary cap and 
even the luxury tax threshold, only a very small minority of teams choose to exceed the luxury 
tax threshold by a large amount.   
It appears that most teams are constrained from raising their payroll above what is observed.  
Because of this, teams may not be able to compensate players for higher tax rates in the form of 
higher salaries.  In fact, of the teams in our sample, 49.8% of them are already over the cap prior 
to the free agency period.  These teams, on average, must sign an average of 4.88 players in free 
agency in order to get to the league minimum roster size of 14, and will be greatly restricted in 
the signing of free agents.  However, this is an underestimate of the number of teams that are 
constrained, as an additional 50 teams have less than 20% of total cap space available to sign an 
average of 5.32 free agents to reach the league minimum roster size.   
 
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
Assume that each free agent maximizes his utility through his utility function, U(Wkc(S),Xkc), 
which is identical for all free agents, and depends only on the skill-dependent after-tax salary and 
a vector of team and city characteristics, where Wkc(S) is the after-tax salary of a free agent with 
skill level S on team k in city c, and Xkc is a vector of characteristics which are specific to team k 
                                                 
29 It is worth noting that actual luxury tax payments may be somewhat less than 1:1, since luxury tax payments may 
be deductible as operating expenses for each team’s state and federal income taxes (Reilly & Schweihs, 2004). 
30 Team abbreviations: NYK-New York Knicks, DAL-Dallas Mavericks, CLE-Cleveland Cavaliers, DEN-Denver 
Nuggets, HOU-Houston Rockets, MIA-Miami Heat, BOS-Boston Celtics, SAS-San Antonio Spurs, LAL-Los 
Angeles Lakers, PHO-Phoenix Suns, GSW-Golden State Warriors, IND-Indiana Pacers, DET-Detroit Pistons, NJN-
New Jersey Nets, TOR-Toronto Raptors, LAC-Los Angeles Clippers, CHI-Chicago Bulls, MIL-Milwaukee Bucks, 
ORL-Orlando Magic, WAS-Washington Wizards, NOH-New Orleans Hornets, NOO-New Orleans/Oklahoma City 
Hornets, CHA-Charlotte Hornets, ATL-Atlanta Hawks, PHI-Philadelphia 76ers, POR-Portland Trail Blazers, UTA-
Utah Jazz, MEM-Memphis Grizzlies, SEA-Seattle SuperSonics, CHR-Charlotte Bobcats, MIN-Minnesota 
Timberwolves, SAC-Sacramento Kings. 
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and city c which affect player utility.  Furthermore, assume that it is the goal of team k to 
maximize ΣS subject to some spending constraint B.  For simplicity, let wkc(S) be the pre-tax 
salary of a free agent with skill level S on team k in city c, such that Wkc(S) = wkc(S)*(1- tkc), 
where tkc is the state tax rate faced by players on team k in city c.   
Suppose that a free agent with skill level S=s receives two pre-tax salary offers; the free 
agent is offered w11(s) from team 1, and the free agent is offered w22(s) from team 2.  If all 
elements of Xkc are identical, such that X11=X22, then the free agent will accept the offer from 
team 1 if and only if the after-tax salary offered by team 1 is greater than (or equal to) the after-
tax salary offered by team 2; that is, if W11(s) ≥ W22(s) or w11(s)*(1-t11)   ≥ w22(s)*(1-t22).   
Suppose for a moment that the state income tax rates faced by players on each team are 
equivalent, i.e. t11= t22.  In this case, the free agent will accept the highest pre-tax offer.  
However, if we now suppose that the tax rate which faces players on team 1 is greater than the 
tax rate which faces players on team 2, t11 > t22, then free agents will accept offers from team 1 if 
and only if the pre-tax salary offer from team 1 is greater than (or equal to) the pre-tax salary 
offer from team 2; w11(s) ≥ w22(s)*[(1-t22)/(1-t11)], where (1-t22)/(1-t11) > 1.   
Now, let U(W11(s),X11)= U(W22(s),X22), relaxing the assumption that X11=X22 and allowing 
t11 and t22 to differ.  If t11 were to rise relative to t22 to a level of t11’ and w11(s) and w22(s) were to 
remain unchanged, then U(W11(s),X11) < U(W22(s),X22), and players with offers from team 1 and 
team 2 would choose to play for team 2.  However, if team 1 were to offer a high enough pre-tax 
wage, w11’ (s), such that w11’ (s)*(1- t11’) ≥ W11(s), then it would be possible to for team 1 to sign 
players with offers from team 2. 
The implication of this theory is that for team 1 to sign a free agent which also has an offer 
from team 2, team 1 must compensate him for the income tax rate differential, holding constant 
all other team and city specific characteristics which a player cares about.  While a free agent 
may make a counteroffer to team 1 which explicitly considers tax rates, to the extent to which it 
is not possible for team 1 to compensate a free agent for the income tax rate differential (due to 
salary cap restrictions, the luxury tax threshold, etc.), it would be expected that team 2 will be 
able to sign the free agent.  Indeed, team 2 will likely be able to sign most of the free agents with 
offers from both team 1 and team 2, and team 1 will have to target many lower skilled free 
agents which team 2 has no interest in.  In this case, the average skill of the free agents signed by 
team 2 will be higher than the average skill of the free agents signed by team 1. 
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In the preceding theoretical analysis, a free agent’s skill level S has been taken as known, 
and it has been implicitly assumed that both teams have the same expectation of the free agent’s 
skill level S.  It may be worth noting that in reality each team may have a different expectation 
about S.  There may also be other considerations which may affect each team’s evaluation of a 
given player such as player maturity and off-court behavior, or team cohesiveness.          
 
2.5 The Data 
The data used in this paper comes from a multitude of sources.  National Basketball 
Association player contract data, which includes data on team, year, position played, contract 
length, and total contract dollar amount, is taken from USA Today Salaries Database and the Pro 
Sports Transactions website.  Player performance data is taken from the Database Basketball 
website.  State and federal income tax rate data is taken from the National Bureau of Economic 
Analysis Taxsim.  Canadian central and provincial tax rates are taken from the Canada Revenue 
Agency.  State effective sales taxes and effective property taxes are calculated from the Census 
of Governments.  MSA demographic data, including population, employment, and income per 
capita, are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Data pertaining to the relevant 
exchange rate between the United States and Canada is taken from the Bank of Canada. 
Summary statistics for all free agent signees broken down by the relative income tax rate 
quartiles (deviation from season mean) are available in Table 2.2.31  Furthermore, all summary 
statistics are weighted by contract length so that our sample is representative of the entire 
population of free agent signees.   
Inference of summary statistics is by no means rigorous; however, by looking at the 
summary statistics, a few patterns are noticeable.  It appears that income tax rates and properties 
tax rates have a negative relationship, as do income tax rates and sales tax rates, as one might 
expect.  There does not seem to be much of a trend in total contract amount or average salary 
across income tax quartiles.  However, it does appear that free agents that sign into relatively 
lower income tax quartiles have more points per game, blocks per game, rebounds per game, 
assists per game, and a higher free throw percentage, all leading to a higher performance per 
game measure throughout their career.  They are also more likely to have been all-stars, and to 
                                                 
31 Income tax rates are the effective marginal tax rate for each team deviated from the team level mean in each 
season.  Sales tax and property tax rates are state effective tax rates calculated from the Census of Governments, 
deviated from the team level mean in each season. 
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be taken earlier in the NBA draft.     
Ideally, to determine the impact of an income tax differential, we would compare two teams 
which are identical in every aspect except for the income tax rates faced by the two teams, and 
observe the difference in skill of the free agent signees or the incremental salary increase which 
is necessary to make a free agent indifferent between the two teams.  However, since we cannot 
observe any team’s counterfactual, we must take a different approach.  Since we can only 
observe accepted offers, we must compare the salaries of free agent signees of differing skill 
levels that sign with different teams, and attempt to control for differences between the players 
and teams.  First, we must determine the relevant comparable team specific income tax rate 
which faces each NBA free agent signee.  Quick inspection of the data shows that every free 
agent signee in the sample is above the highest tax threshold in their respective state and the 
majority make at least a few million dollars more, so the highest marginal tax rate in each state is 
a good approximation for the actual tax rate that each free agent signee will face in that state.  
State and local tax rates are federal tax deductible, so we must adjust the state and local marginal 
tax rates to get an effective tax rate.  Since forty-one games take place in the home state and 
forty-one games take place on the road, and each team typically has road games in approximately 
the same locations each season, we can find a linear combination of effective marginal state and 
local income tax rates that face each team’s players.32  Because the season takes place over the 
course of two separate years, the tax is paid over two separate years, possibly at different tax 
rates.  For more about how our relative income tax rate measure is formulated, see the appendix.   
Due to the way that our relative income tax rate measure for each year is calculated, we can 
garner some intuition about when the relative income tax rate will change.  Obviously, any 
change to the highest marginal state or local income tax rate will change the relative income tax 
rate facing any of that state’s home teams, however, it will also alter the relative income tax rate 
facing any other team in the league, both because their players may pay some tax towards that 
state, and because it changes the mean tax rate for that year.  This makes sense, since a change to 
the tax rate facing other teams greatly alters the after-tax salary available to each free agent if 
they had signed with that other team.  In the same way, any change to a U.S. federal or Canadian 
                                                 
32 Each team plays other teams in the same division four times, twice on the road and twice at home.  Each team 
plays all teams in the opposing conference twice, once on the road and once at home.  Each team plays all teams in 
their conference from different divisions three to four times each, split as evenly as possible between home and 
away games.   
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central tax rate policy will also change the relative income tax rate facing each team by raising or 
lowering the relative income tax rate facing free agents that sign with the Toronto Raptors, the 
only Canadian team in our sample.  For example, if the U.S. government decides to increase 
federal tax rates, the relative income tax rate facing the Toronto Raptors’ players will fall since 
the league’s average tax rate will rise relative to the Toronto Raptors’ tax rate.  Any change in 
league alignment, such as that which took place prior to the 2004-2005 NBA season, will also 
alter relative income tax rates since the opponents that teams will face each year will change.  It 
is worth noting that, since provincial tax rates are not tax deductible from Canadian taxes, and 
Canadian tax rates are typically different from U.S. federal tax rates, provincial tax rates must be 
adjusted so that they are comparable to any U.S. state in the preceding analysis.33   
Figure 2.2 shows the relative income tax rate facing each team between the 2001-2002 to 
2007-2008 seasons.  After looking over Figure 2.2, it should be clear that, while the relative tax 
rate may vary significantly across teams, they may not vary much within teams over time.  
However, even changes of a fraction of a percentage point, which occur quite frequently within 
the sample, may represent a large change in after-tax salary.  The largest change in relative 
income tax occurred for those players on the Toronto Raptors between when the U.S. dropped its 
federal income tax rate from 39.1% in 2001 to 35% in 2003.  Players on the New Jersey Nets 
also experience a change in income tax rates when the New Jersey increased their state income 
tax from 6.37% in 2003 to 8.97% in 2004.  New York State also increased income tax rates from 
6.85% in 2002 to 7.7% in 2003, only to return them to 6.85% in 2006.  
Figure 2.3a shows the distribution of relative income tax rates accepted by free agent 
signees. Figure 2.3b shows the distribution of relative income tax rates accepted by free agent 
signees weighted by contract length, and Figure 2.3c shows the distribution of relative income 
tax rates facing each team’s players.  Since the distributions in Figure 2.3a and Figure 2.3b are 
nearly identical, we would not expect that there is much correlation between relative tax rates 
and the length of contract being signed.  However, it does appear that those teams with the 
lowest relative income tax rate are offering shorter contracts.  A comparison of Figure 2.3a to 
Figure 2.3c yields the same conclusion.   
                                                 
33 The provincial tax in Toronto is not deductible from Candian tax in the same way that state tax is deductible from 
U.S. federal taxes.  While the Canadian government will generally also not give tax credits for income earned in 
foreign countries, the U.S. government generally will give tax credits for all foreign tax.  My analysis has taken this 
into account.  See IRS Publication 514 (Department of the Treasury, 2010). 
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2.6 Methodology 
I will seek to estimate the causal effect of changes in relative income tax rates on the labor 
migration decisions and compensation of NBA players.  It will be necessary to consider those 
factors which might affect a team’s ability to recruit a free agent which are correlated with the 
relative income tax rate.  The factors we will include are the relative sales tax rate, the relative 
property tax rate, a lag in the natural logarithm of the population (in the MSA), a lag in the 
natural log of per capita income (in the MSA), a lag in the natural log of employment (in the 
MSA), the exchange rate (adjusted for purchasing power parity), a lag in the state’s crime rate 
(per 100,000), a lag in the state’s student-teacher ratio, the team’s wins last season, whether the 
free agent switches teams, and the amount of money a team can use to attract free agents under 
the salary cap.  Clearly the sales tax and property tax rates ultimately affect a player’s amount of 
discretionary income, and both are correlated with income tax rates.  Population, income, and 
employment are relevant because they affect consumer demand for basketball, and ultimately 
may affect the salary a team is willing to offer free agents, while at the same time they may be 
correlated with a change in income tax rate.  The hope here is that if taxes change in response to 
economic problems that also adversely affect an NBA team, that those economic problems can 
be fully explained by changes in population, income, and employment.  The crime rate and 
student teacher ratio may be reasons why tax rates increase.  For example, if a state decides to 
increase expenditures in response to a high crime rate in order to pay for additional police 
officers or longer prison terms, they may have to increase tax rates to finance the additional 
spending.   A similar argument would hold for a response to school quality, so both crime rate 
and student teacher ratio may be correlated with changes in the relative income tax rate, while 
they may also be correlated with a player’s preferences.34  A team’s wins last season might 
increase labor supply, since players may be more willing to play for a winning team.  Whether a 
player resigns with a team may also ultimately affect the amount of money which a team can 
offer, through the “Larry Bird” family of exceptions.  The amount of money a team has to spend 
on free agents may also affect whether a given free agent signs with a team, both through the 
direct effect of increasing the likelihood of a higher salary offer, and through the indirect effect 
                                                 
34 Crime rates could be correlated with higher tax rates since governments are likely to respond to crime problems 
by enlarging police forces.  See Cornwell and Trumbull (2004) and Loftin and McDowall (1982) for a more 
thorough description.  Figlio and O’Sullivan (2001) present a model which causes tax rates to respond to a high 
student-teacher ratio.   
 61 
 
of being able to improve the team by attracting other top quality free agents.  We include lags for 
some variables because it would be impossible for a free agent to estimate the current value of 
things such as population counts or crime rates since these data are usually gathered with a lag.  
We will focus on the differences between a free agent’s signing team and the overall average of 
all other teams, which best represent a free agent’s outside option in the available data, since we 
do not know which other teams have given offers to a free agent. 
My empirical model takes the form  
 
     SKILLijct = β0 + β1TAXct + β2Xit + β3TEAM DUMMYj + β4TIME DUMMYt + εijct        (1) 
     LOG SALARYijct = γ0 + γ1TAXct + γ2Zit + γ3TEAM DUMMYj + γ4TIME DUMMYt + ηijct (2) 
 
where SKILLijct is the measured skill of free agent i at time t which is hired by team j in city c, 
TAXct  is the relative income tax rate of city c in year t, Xit  is a vector of the individual specific 
characteristics of free agent i measured at time t, TEAM DUMMYj  is a dummy variable which 
takes a value of 1 if a team j signs free agent i at time t and 0 if it does not, and TIME DUMMYt 
is a vector of dummy variables which take a value of 1 if the free agent i was signed in year t, 
and take a value of 0 otherwise. 
Note that if the model takes the form shown above, that β1, the coefficient on TAXct in (1), is 
identified by a change in the skill of free agent signees within a team-city pairing brought about 
by a change in the relative income tax rate facing a team’s players over time.  In the same 
fashion, γ1, the coefficient on TAXct in (2), is identified by a change in the natural logarithm of 
annual salaries of free agent signees within a team-city pairing brought about by a change in the 
relative income tax rate facing a team’s players over time.  So β1 represents the average change 
in the measured skill level of free agent signees which is brought about by a one-percentage 
point change in the relative income tax rate, and γ1 represents the average change in the natural 
logarithm of the annual salary of free agent signees which is brought about by a one percentage 
point change in the relative income tax rate.  If the majority of changes in the tax rate 
differentials are capitalized in the average salaries of free agent signees, then we would expect 
little or no effect on the change in skill level of free agent signees brought about by changes in 
the relative income tax rate (Wallace 2002). However, if changes in the tax rate differential are 
not capitalized in the average salaries of free agent signees, then we may expect large changes in 
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the skill level of free agent signees brought about by changes in the relative income tax rate 
(Wallace 2002).  Due to the identification strategy that is employed here, if we believe that any 
factor which we have chosen to ignore is time invariant, then omitting these factors will not 
change our results.   
The problem which remains is that skill is difficult to measure.  The many statistics which 
are measured by the National Basketball Association can be combined to create a proxy for skill.  
We will use the market value of these statistics to index free agent skill.  To determine the 
market value of each statistic, we run the regression of the natural logarithm of the average 
annual salary of the contract signed by each free agent on the statistics that each free agent has 
put up over the preceding years of his career, on a per game or per 48 minute basis.  The 
predicted value of this regression will then represent the measured skill of each free agent signee.  
The results of this regression are shown in Table 2.3.   
Specifications 1-3 show the regression of the natural logarithm of average annual salary on 
per game statistics over the career of each free agent prior to their contract signing, while 
specifications 4-6 show the regression of the natural logarithm of average annual salary on 
statistics which are calculated per 48 minutes (the length of one full NBA game) over the career 
of each free agent prior to their contract signing. Specifications 4-6 should adjust upward the 
measured relative skill level of any “highly skilled” free agent which has not played a large 
number of minutes per game throughout his career and adjust downward the relative skill level 
of any “low skilled” free agent which has played a high number of minutes per game throughout 
his career.   
From Table 2.3, we get many expected results.  For instance, a free agent’s annual salary 
seems to be positively correlated with seasons played, games played per season, and minutes 
played per game, as well as points, blocks, rebounds, and assists per game (or per 48 minutes), 
and a free agent’s annual salary seems to be negatively correlated with turnovers, fouls, missed 
field goals, and missed free throw attempts per game (or per 48 minutes).  However, steals, 
which are generally thought to be a positive statistic, tend to be somewhat negatively correlated 
with salary.  One reason why this might be the case is that it is generally the shorter players 
which get the most steals.  To the extent that this height difference is not fully captured by 
differences in position, it might be captured in the steals statistic in the form of lower salaries 
since we have not included a height variable in the regression equation.  On average, centers 
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make more than both forwards and guards, and forwards make more than guards, although this 
result is not statistically significant.    
Using the predicted values of the regression in Table 2.3 (Column 2), we can estimate the 
average skill level of free agent signees for each team in the NBA over the seasons in our 
sample.   Figure 2.4a plots the average skill level of free agent signees for each team against the 
average tax rate for each team relative to the rest of the league.  The average skill level of each 
team’s free agent signees is negatively correlated with the relative income tax rate facing each 
team’s players.  Figure 2.4b plots the average salary of each team’s free agent signees against the 
average tax rate for each team relative to the rest of the league.  The average salary of each 
team’s free agent signees is positively correlated with the relative income tax rate facing each 
team’s players.      
We can then standardize the predicted values of the regression from Table 2.3 to put our 
measure of skill into units that we can more easily interpret.  We then run the regression in (1).  
The regression results are shown in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5.35 36 37  Whether we look at Table 
2.4, which uses a performance per game measure as the dependent variable, or Table 2.5, which 
uses a performance per 48 minutes measure, we find that decreasing the marginal income tax rate 
by 1 percentage point in our full specification leads to a 0.080-0.088 standard deviation increase 
in the skill of the average free agent signee for a given team, ceteris paribus.  This effect is both 
economically and statistically significant.38     
As Wallace (2002) suggests, since the skill of free agent signees responds to changes in the 
relative income tax rate, it must be the case that teams do not fully compensate all free agents for 
                                                 
35While Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 show the regression results using the predicted value of the regression from Column 
2 of Table 2.3, and Column 5 of Table 2.3 respectively, use of other specifications from table 2.3 to index skill does 
not drastically change our results.   
36 Inclusion of team specific linear time trends does not change the point estimate of the coefficient of interest; 
however standard errors become increasingly large.      
37 For an in-depth look at clustered standard errors, see Angrist and Pischke (2008).  For information about two-way 
clustering, see Cameron et al (2006) and Thompson (2009). 
38As a robustness test, in order to make sure that these results are not driven by one “outlier” team, I systematically 
remove one team at a time to see what happens to the coefficient on RELATIVE INCOME TAX RATE.  Exclusion 
of the Toronto Raptors from our sample leads to a coefficient on RELATIVE INCOME TAX RATE of -0.283 when 
PERFORMANCE PER GAME is the dependent variable; however this reduces both the sample size and the 
variance of relative income tax rates, leading a much larger standard error of 0.181.  Excluding the Houston Rockets 
from our sample leads to a coefficient on RELATIVE INCOME TAX RATE of -0.028 when PERFORMANCE 
PER GAME is the dependent variable with a standard error of 0.027; again this reduces both the sample size and the 
variance of relative income tax rates.  Removal of any other team one at a time does not appear to drastically change 
our results.  Using the WIN SCORE PER GAME measure, the coefficient on RELATIVE INCOME TAX RATE 
with either team removed is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.     
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the income tax differential.  While it appears that free agents are, on average, reacting to changes 
in the marginal income tax rate, it is still possible that some teams are able to compensate some 
free agents for changes in the relative income tax rate in order to sign them.  Therefore, it 
remains to check whether any of the changes in the relative income tax rate are capitalized in the 
salaries of free agent signees.  These results are found in Table 2.6.  Theoretically, to fully 
compensate a player for a 1% increase in tax rates, salaries must increase by approximately 
1.01%.  Therefore, if any teams are able to compensate some free agents for changes in the 
relative income tax rate in order to sign them, then we would expect a positive coefficient on the 
relative income tax rate which is less than 0.0101.  However, none of our specifications led to a 
coefficient on the relative income tax rate which is statistically significant, and all of the 
specifications lead to a negative coefficient.  Therefore, we are able to learn very little about how 
changes in relative income tax rates affect the salaries of free agent signees.  However, it is not 
hard to believe that teams in the NBA are too financially constrained to be able to compensate 
free agents for any income tax differential, as we have discussed in previous sections. 
To further illuminate the effect of a 1 percentage point fall in the relative income tax rate, 
we can convert the 0.080 standard deviation increase in the skill of the average free agent signee 
to a dollar figure which comes from the market price of the incremental increase in skill.  In 
particular, by taking an approximation around the average performance per game measure, we 
find that a 1 percentage point fall in the relative income tax rate leads to an average free agent 
signee skill increase worth $231,260 per year.  However, if the average free agent were to be 
taxed an additional 1 percentage point on their average log salary, the tax would amount to only 
an additional $30,019.  This does seem like an extremely large effect for such a relatively small 
amount of money.  We would think that if a team were able to pay an extra $30,019, on average, 
to a free agent, then they could fully compensate them for a 1% tax differential.  However there 
are a few reasons why this might be plausible.  Since the most highly skilled free agents will 
usually earn maximum contracts with a maximum contract length, it is impossible for relatively 
high income tax teams to compensate these free agents for any tax differential.  Since teams may 
be strained financially, free agents may opt to take even a little more in after tax dollars to play 
for teams with lower tax rates.  Furthermore, since the skill distribution of free agent signees is 
very spread out (standard deviation in performance per game is 0.92, which translates to roughly 
$2,676,123 in terms of market worth), and there are a limited number of free agent signees each 
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year (an average of 93 or approximately 3 per team), a change in relative income tax rates which 
attract or discourage only one or two free agents from signing may result in large resulting skill 
differences among free agents signees.  Figure 2.5 makes this increasingly clear.  Each bar in 
Figure 2.5 is split into 0.080 standard deviations of the skill variable.  If we use 2001 as an 
example, we can see that in the tails of the distribution there are often one or fewer free agent 
signees in any 0.080 standard deviation area.  
Next, I decide to look at other metrics of NBA performance to see if they show 
corroborating results.  Specifically, I look to the NBA Efficiency, Game Score, and Win Score 
measures of performance, since they are easily calculated using our dataset.  NBA efficiency is a 
statistic which is reported by the National Basketball Association website, and it is believed that 
many coaches and executives rely on the NBA efficiency measure to evaluate player 
performance (Berri, Schmidt, & Brook, 2006).  Game Score is a measure created by sports writer 
John Hollinger in order to measure single game performances.  Win score is a measure created 
by economist David Berri from a regression of team wins on points scored and points allowed 
per possession (Berri, Schmidt, & Brook, 2006).  Despite its name, NBA efficiency measures 
performance quite inefficiently; it is a linear combination of box score statistics, all with equal 
weight.  Game score gives different weight to the statistics that John Hollinger felt “evaluate 
players in a fashion consistent with what NBA observers would believe (Berri, 2006).”  The win 
score measure does slightly better by giving more weight to those box score statistics which are 
more closely correlated with winning or losing games.  A major downfall of all three of these 
measures is that they measure only box score statistics, and thus give no added value to 
experience.  The results are shown in Table 2.7.    
Decreasing the relative income tax rate by 1 percentage point leads to a 0.117 standard 
deviation skill increase in the average free agent signee for a given team, as measured by win 
score per game, or a 0.182 standard deviation skill increase as measured by win score per 48 
minutes.  These results are statistically significant at the 2% and 1% level, respectively.  The 
coefficient on relative income tax rate when the dependent variable is NBA efficiency (per game 
or per 48 minutes) or game score (per game or per 48 minutes) is negative, although not 
statistically significant.  We might believe this is because NBA efficiency and game score are not 
very accurate measures of skill (Berri, 2006).  It does seem that a decrease in relative income tax 
rates leads to an increase in the skill of free agent signees, regardless of how skill is measured.    
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As has been argued thus far, we find that decreasing the marginal income tax rate leads to an 
increase in the skill of the average free agent signee for a given team.  If this is the case, then we 
might expect that team success might be significantly affected by a change in tax rates.  This is 
shown in Table 2.8.  We find that decreasing the relative income tax rate by 1 percentage point is 
associated with 4.074 more regular season wins in that season in the full specification.  This 
result is significant at the 10% level.  We also find that decreasing the relative income tax rate by 
1 percentage point is associated with 2.422 more playoff wins in that season in the full 
specification.  This result is not significant at the 10% level, although it is extremely close given 
a small sample size of 206 team-season observations.   
 
2.7 Conclusion 
By using a dataset of professional basketball players’ contracts from the 2001-2002 to 2007-
2008 seasons, which has rich uncensored data on worker productivity, I am able to identify the 
effect that changes in state and local income tax rates have on the labor migration decisions of 
high income NBA free agents.  I find, after controlling for other observable characteristics of 
teams, cities, states, and MSAs, that an increase in the relative income tax rates facing players on 
a given team leads to a decrease in the average skill of the free agents that that team is able to 
sign.   
While it is difficult to measure skill, we determine the value that teams in the National 
Basketball Association attach to different player attributes by regressing the natural logarithm of 
annual salary on a free agent’s career statistics prior to signing his contract.  Using market 
weights, we can aggregate a free agent’s career statistics to determine their measurable skill 
level.  I then find that after controlling for other observable characteristics of teams, cities, states, 
and MSAs, that a one percentage point increase in the marginal state income tax rates facing 
players on a given team leads to a 0.080 to 0.088 standard deviation decrease in the average skill 
of the free agents that that team is able to sign. Other metrics of player performance seem to see 
corroborate these results.  
While the focus of this paper is very specific, it would appear that the results may be 
generalizable to a larger population.  While I find that an increase in the marginal state income 
tax rates facing players on a given NBA team leads to a decrease in the average skill of the free 
agents that that team is able to sign, an analogous result might hold for athletes in other sports.  
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A similar result might also hold for actors, singers, and other entertainers, which are taxed in a 
similar fashion.  Cities are clamoring to improve their culture, and perhaps state income tax rates 
have some effect on attracting quality in other entertainment areas as well.   
Future research might look at the relationship between income tax rates and labor migration 
in other major sports.  Of particular interest might be how the collective bargaining agreement 
set up in each sport frames this relationship.  For instance, in Major League Baseball, where 
there is no salary cap and the luxury tax is much weaker than in the NBA, are tax rates more 
likely to be capitalized in salaries?  Or, did a hard salary cap in the National Football League 
prior to the 2010 season prevent teams from compensating free agents for an income tax 
differential, causing labor migration to be very sensitive to tax rates, and did this change when 
the salary cap was dropped in the 2010 season?    
The current NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement is set to expire on June 30, 2011, and 
front and center to the issues surrounding the new CBA is the salary cap (Garcia, 2010).  The 
owners are currently pushing for a hard cap for each team which cannot be exceeded, while the 
union vehemently opposes one.  I will not sound off on this debate at the moment, however, 
based on the results of this paper, it may make sense to allow the salary cap of each team to 
respond to changes in the relative income tax rate facing each team’s players.  This would give 
teams the ability to compensate free agents for changes in the relative income tax rate, and 
maintain their ability to attract top free agents. 
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Figure 2.1: Average NBA Player Salary, 2001-02 to 2007-08 Seasons 
 
Table 2.1: Top Ten NBA Payrolls in Millions of Dollars, 2001-2007 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Season     2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Salary Cap    $42.5  $40.3  $43.8  $43.9  $49.5  $53.2  $55.6 
Luxury Tax Threshold  -----   $52.9  $54.6  -----   $61.7  $65.4  $67.9 
Highest Team Payroll  $85.3(NYK) $104.3(POR) $84.5(NYK) $94.1(NYK) $92.9(NYK) $82.4(PHO) $92.8(NYK) 
2nd Highest Team Payroll  $84.0(POR) $93.0(NYK) $84.3(POR) $87.4(DAL) $79.6(SAS) $81.7(NYK) $88.4(DAL) 
3rd Highest Team Payroll  $57.8(PHI) $70.8(DAL) $79.0(DAL) $80.2(POR) $68.3(DAL) $78.2(MIA) $84.2(CLE) 
4th Highest Team Payroll    $56.5(DAL) $70.4(SAC) $72.4(MIN) $70.1(MIN) $66.6(IND) $75.5(DET) $81.2(DEN) 
5th Highest Team Payroll  $55.6(MIL) $65.3(PHI) $69.6(SAC) $68.1(ORL) $64.6(MEM) $66.7(MIN) $77.6(HOU) 
6th Highest Team Payroll  $54.8(SAC) $62.6(LAL) $65.5(LAL) $66.3(IND) $61.6(NJN) $65.6(SAS) $74.7(MIA) 
7th Highest Team Payroll  $54.7(PHO) $60.5(MEM) $65.2(PHO) $65.1(LAL) $60.5(SAC) $65.0(DEN) $73.8(BOS) 
8th Highest Team Payroll  $54.5(MIN) $60.4(NJN) $63.5(ATL) $63.8(PHI) $59.7(PHI) $64.8(DAL) $72.5(SAS) 
9th Highest Team Payroll  $54.3(UTA) $60.0(MIL) $60.3(TOR) $60.6(SAC) $59.7(PHO) $64.8(POR) $71.3(LAL) 
10th Highest Team Payroll  $53.7(DEN) $59.5(MIN) $59.1(BOS) $59.5(MIA) $59.7(MIA) $63.8(NJN) $71.2(PHO) 
Teams Above Luxury Tax   -----   16/29  13/28  -----   5/30   6/30   11/30 
Teams Above Salary Cap  27/29  29/29  25/28  24/30  24/30  24/30  24/30 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a Payroll Data comes from the USA Today Salary Database.  Salary cap and luxury tax information comes from the SportsCity website
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics by Income Tax Rate Quartile, weighted by contract length 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Relative Income Tax Rate   Overall   (1)    (2)    (3)        (4)  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Observations     744    209    163    186    186 
Relative Income Tax Rate (%)  -0.03 (2.18)  -2.64 (0.13)  -0.61 (0.27)  0.68 (0.52)  2.69 (1.76) 
Relative Property Tax Rate (%)  0.06 (0.68)  0.41 (0.67)  -0.09 (0.70)  0.12 (0.80)  -0.45 (1.11) 
Relative Sales Tax Rate (%)  0.14 (1.28)  0.74 (0.25)  -0.61 (1.11)  -0.06 (0.89)  0.37 (1.89) 
Contract Length (Unweighted)  2.38 (1.77)  2.31 (1.71)  2.44 (1.79)  2.42 (1.87)  2.34 (1.72) 
Contract Amount    2.63e07 (3.02e07) 2.67e07 (3.22e07) 2.59e07 (2.82e07) 2.56e07 (2.83e07) 2.70e07 (3.20e07) 
Log Contract Amount   16.02 (1.78)  15.92 (1.84)  16.10 (1.73)  16.06 (1.74)  16.02 (1.81) 
Average Salary     5.25e06 (4.96e06)  5.32e06 (5.45e06) 5.28e06 (4.72e06) 5.04e06 (4.62e06) 5.38e06 (4.96e06) 
Log Average Salary    14.91 (1.18)  14.85 (1.25)  14.97 (1.15)  14.92 (1.13)  14.93 (1.21) 
Black      0.783 (0.412)  0.727 (0.447)  0.804 (0.398)  0.809 (0.394)  0.800 (0.401) 
Center      0.181 (0.385)  0.154 (0.367)  0.188 (0.392)  0.176 (0.381)  0.204 (0.404) 
Forward      0.396 (0.489)  0.424 (0.495)  0.362 (0.482)  0.420 (0.495)  0.369 (0.484) 
Seasons      5.58 (3.75)  5.67 (4.14)  5.29 (3.51)  5.72 (3.50)  5.61 (3.81) 
Games per Season    55.14 (23.11)  55.13 (25.37)  55.10 (22.55)  56.27 (20.08)  54.02 (23.12) 
Minutes per game     22.11 (10.82)  22.87 (11.95)  21.46 (10.18)  22.31 (10.18)  21.65 (10.75) 
Blocks per game    0.52 (0.63)  0.585 (0.753)  0.442 (0.477)  0.530 (0.662)  0.522 (0.565) 
Steals per game    0.75 (0.48)  0.745 (0.469)  0.781 (0.502)  0.768 (0.515)  0.697 (0.445) 
Points per game    9.12 (6.14)  9.79 (6.70)  8.52 (5.68)  9.07 (5.59)  8.95 (6.42) 
Offensive Rebounds per Game  1.18 (0.89)  1.20 (0.94)  1.20 (0.84)  1.16 (0.88)  1.21 (0.91)   
Defensive Rebounds per Game  2.76 (1.84)  2.89 (2.07)  2.67 (1.72)  2.72 (1.79)  2.75 (1.74) 
Assists per Game    2.00 (1.79)  2.07 (1.79)  2.02 (1.84)  2.12 (1.97)  1.78 (1.50) 
Turnovers per Game    1.38 (0.84)  1.46 (0.94)  1.35 (0.80)  1.38 (0.79)  1.32 (0.79) 
Fouls Per Game    2.04 (0.91)  2.06 (0.99)  2.08 (0.88)  2.00 (0.85)  2.05 (0.92) 
Missed FG per Game   4.13 (2.64)  4.30 (2.73)  3.98 (2.53)  4.17 (2.50)  4.05 (2.77) 
Missed FT Percentage    0.240 (0.12)  0.231 (0.123)  0.239 (0.114)  0.242 (0.116)  0.250 (0.128) 
Performance per Game   14.91 (0.97)  14.96 (1.07)  14.88 (0.91)  14.95 (0.91)  14.86 (0.95)  
All-Star Appearances per Season 0.077 (0.193)  0.105 (0.239)  0.054 (0.132)  0.074 (0.181)  0.069 (0.192)    
Contract Renewal    0.492 (0.500)  0.505 (0.501)  0.543 (0.500)  0.460 (0.500)  0.466 (0.500) 
1/Draft Pick (0 if undrafted)  0.109 (0.199)  0.158 (0.264)  0.067 (0.107)  0.112 (0.213)  0.091 (0.146) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a All free agent statistics are career averages prior to contract signing.  All statistics are weighted by contract length unless otherwise noted.  Standard deviation is 
in parenthesis. 
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Figure 2.2: Relative State and Local Income Tax rates in the NBA, 2001-02 to 2007-08 Seasons 
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Figure 2.2 continued: Relative State and Local Income Tax rates in the NBA, 2001-02 to 2007-08 Seasons 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Income Tax Rates in the NBA, 2001-02 to 2007-08 Seasons 
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Table 2.3: Regression of the Logarithm of Yearly Salary Weighted by Contract Length   
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Explanatory Variable   (1)    (2)    (3)        (4)    (5)    (6) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
CONSTANT     13.152***(0.075) 13.088***(0.083) 13.208***(0.089) 13.158***(0.080) 13.111***(0.088) 13.232** (0.089) 
GAMES PER SEASON   0.013*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.002) 0.014*** (0.003) 0.010*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002)     0.013*** (0.003) 
MINUTES PER GAME   0.024 (0.013) 0.029* (0.013) 0.029* (0.013) 0.061*** (0.006) 0.061*** (0.006)     0.055*** (0.006) 
POINTS PER GAME   0.101*** (0.023) 0.100*** (0.023) 0.106*** (0.023) -----    -----            ----- 
BLOCKS PER GAME   0.122 (0.071) 0.075 (0.075) 0.060 (0.077) -----    -----                ----- 
STEALS PER GAME   -0.022 (0.107) 0.017 (0.109) -0.030 (0.107) -----    -----                ----- 
OFFENSIVE REBS PER GAME 0.183** (0.077) 0.160* (0.079) 0.135 (0.079) -----    -----                 ----- 
DEFENSIVE REBS PER GAME 0.086 (0.044) 0.084 (0.045) 0.078 (0.045) -----    -----                ----- 
ASSISTS PER GAME   0.142*** (0.037) 0.143*** (0.038) 0.142*** (0.038) -----    -----                ----- 
TURNOVERS PER GAME  -0.300*** (0.107) -0.288*** (0.107) -0.294*** (0.107) -----    -----                ----- 
FOULS PER GAME   0.032 (0.069) -0.008 (0.071) 0.007 (0.072) -----    -----                ----- 
MISSED FG PER GAME   -0.114* (0.052) -0.114* (0.051) -0.128** (0.051) -----    -----                ----- 
MISSED FT PERCENTAGE  -0.958*** (0.291) -1.051*** (0.293) -0.450 (0.343) -1.067*** (0.376) -1.055*** (0.375) -0.677 (0.379) 
BLOCKS PER 48 MINS   -----    -----    -----    0.104*** (0.036) 0.084*  (0.038)    0.086* (0.038) 
STEALS PER 48 MINS   -----    -----    -----    -0.122** (0.049) -0.108*  (0.050)    -0.059 (0.050) 
POINTS PER 48 MINS       -----    -----    -----    0.039*** (0.009) 0.038***  (0.009)    0.043*** (0.009) 
OFFENSIVE REBS PER 48 MINS -----    -----    -----    0.089*** (0.033) 0.082*  (0.034)    0.075* (0.033) 
DEFENSIVE REBS PER 48 MINS -----    -----    -----    0.048* (0.022) 0.045* (0.022)     0.060*** (0.022) 
ASSISTS PER 48 MINS   -----    -----    -----    0.061 (0.018) 0.064***  (0.019)      0.077*** (0.019) 
TURNOVERS PER 48 MINS   -----    -----    -----    -0.107** (0.046) -0.107**  (0.046)    -0.105* (0.045) 
FOULS PER 48 MINS   -----    -----    -----    -0.076*** (0.025) -0.081*** (0.025)     -0.015 (0.029) 
MISSED FG PER 48 MINS  -----    -----    -----    -0.050*** (0.017) -0.044**   (0.018)     -0.019 (0.018) 
EXPERIENCE     0.077*** (0.028) 0.080*** (0.028) ------    0.054 (0.028) 0.055*  (0.028)     ----- 
EXPERIENCE SQUARED  -0.012*** (0.002) -0.013 (0.002) ------    -0.011*** (0.002) -0.011*** (0.002)     ----- 
CENTER      -----    0.258* (0.111) 0.221* (0.109) -----    0.193 (0.118) 0.119 (0.116)         
FORWARD     -----    0.082 (0.077) 0.078 (0.076) -----    0.063 (0.080) 0.052 (0.078)       
Experience dummies    No    No    Yes    No    No             Yes 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Number of Observations   744    744    744    744    744             744 
R
2       0.665   0.667   0.688   0.664   0.666            0.690 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a ***=Significant at 0.01, **=Significant at 0.02, *=Significant at 0.05.  Standard errors are in parenthesis 
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Figure 2.4: Average Skill Level and Salary of Free Agent Signees by Team 
 
        (a)                                                                     (b) 
 
Figure 2.5: Skill Distribution of Free Agents, 2001-2002 Season 
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                Table 2.4: Regression of the Standardized Market Skill Index on Relative Income Tax Rate, Weighted by Contract Length (Column 2, Table 3) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Explanatory Variable     (1)    (2)    (3)        (4)    (5)                
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
RELATIVE INCOME TAX RATE  -0.289*** [0.061] -0.292*** [0.069] -0.274*** [0.088] -0.137*** [0.034]   -0.080** [0.034] 
RELATIVE PROPERTY TAX RATE       -----      -0.015  [0.257] -0.293 [0.470] -0.372  [0.301] -0.316 [0.303] 
RELATIVE SALES TAX RATE   -----    -0.204  [0.118] -0.231  [0.166] -0.096 [0.099] -0.199 [0.107] 
CENTER       -----    0.095  [0.148] 0.067  [0.161] -0.096 [0.129] -0.101 [0.110] 
FORWARD      -----    -0.242*** [0.093] 0.228*  [0.117] 0.132  [0.122] 0.142  [0.137] 
LOG LAG MSA POPULATION   -----    -----    -2.910 [2.166] -3.265*** [0.879] -2.343*** [0.467]  
LOG LAG MSA EMPLOYMENT   -----    -----    1.528  [2.014] 0.798  [1.047] 0.662  [1.413] 
LOG LAG MSA INCOME    -----    -----    -2.856** [1.196] -1.880 [1.730] -0.542 [1.322] 
100*[PPP-1]   ($COUNTRY/$US)   -----    -----    0.122  [0.137] 0.137  [0.104] 0.178* [0.081] 
TEAM WINS LAST SEASON   -----    -----    0.015  [0.011] 0.010  [0.011] 0.012  [0.011] 
LAG CRIME RATE (PER 100,000)  -----    -----    -.0004 [.0004] -.0003 [.0002] -.0002 [.0003] 
LAG STUDENT-TEACHER RATIO  -----    -----    -0.104 [0.105] -0.082 [0.078] -0.075 [0.085] 
CONTRACT RENEWAL    -----    -----    -----    0.953*** [0.101] 0.921*** [0.103] 
PERCENT OF CAP AVAILABLE   -----    -----    -----    -----    0.009  [0.005] 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
R2        0.076    0.089    0.110    0.309    0.325 
a ***=Significant at 0.01, **=Significant at 0.02, *=Significant at 0.05 
b Each regression controls for YEAR and TEAM dummies. c Cluster robust standard errors on TEAM and YEAR in brackets. 
 
                Table 2.5: Regression of the Standardized Market Skill Index on Relative Income Tax Rate, Weighted by Contract Length (Column 5, Table 3) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Explanatory Variable     (1)    (2)    (3)        (4)    (5)                
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
RELATIVE INCOME TAX RATE  -0.281*** [0.065] -0.286*** [0.072] -0.282*** [0.089] -0.147*** [0.045]   -0.088*** [0.030] 
RELATIVE PROPERTY TAX RATE       -----      -0.025  [0.278] -0.295 [0.463] -0.373  [0.309] -0.316 [0.328] 
RELATIVE SALES TAX RATE   -----    -0.251*  [0.114] -0.261  [0.151] -0.127 [0.104] -0.233* [0.115] 
CENTER       -----    0.095  [0.142] 0.067  [0.169] -0.095 [0.134] -0.099 [0.118] 
FORWARD      -----    0.245*** [0.089] 0.231*  [0.110] 0.136  [0.108] 0.147  [0.120] 
LOG LAG MSA POPULATION   -----    -----    -3.290 [2.259] -3.642*** [1.072] -2.700*** [0.727] 
LOG LAG MSA EMPLOYMENT   -----    -----    2.012  [2.157] 1.290  [1.410] 1.150  [1.758] 
LOG LAG MSA INCOME    -----    -----    -2.907** [1.240] -1.939 [1.791] -0.572 [1.348] 
100*[PPP-1]   ($COUNTRY/$US)   -----    -----    0.097  [0.150] 0.112  [0.112] 0.153  [0.091] 
TEAM WINS LAST SEASON   -----    -----    0.013  [0.011] 0.009  [0.010] 0.010  [0.009] 
LAG CRIME RATE (PER 100,000)  -----    -----    -.0005 [.0004] -.0003 [.0003] -.0002 [.0003] 
LAG STUDENT-TEACHER RATIO  -----    -----    -0.100 [0.112] -0.077 [0.088] -0.070 [0.094] 
CONTRACT RENEWAL    -----    -----    -----    0.945*** [0.115] 0.912*** [0.118] 
PERCENT OF CAP AVAILABLE  -----    -----    -----    -----    0.009 *** [0.004] 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
R2        0.079    0.092    0.110    0.307    0.324 
a ***=Significant at 0.01, **=Significant at 0.02, *=Significant at 0.05 
b Each regression controls for YEAR and TEAM dummies. c Cluster robust standard errors on TEAM and YEAR in brackets.
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 Table 2.6: Regression of the Logarithm of Average Annual Salary on Relative Income Tax Rate, Weighted by Contract Length   
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Explanatory Variable   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
REL INCOME TAX RATE  -0.016  [0.070]  -0.017 [0.063] -0.009 [0.062] -0.010 [0.062] 
REL SALES TAX RATE  -0.086  [0.145] -0.058 [0.143] -0.050 [0.149] -0.030 [0.152] 
REL PROP TAX RATE  -0.010  [0.266] -0.048 [0.261] -0.030  [0.256] -0.049 [0.257] 
CENTER     0.249    [0.185] -0.036 [0.099] 0.196  [0.171] -0.038 [0.118] 
FORWARD    0.127  [0.137] 0.008  [0.094] 0.107  [0.133] 0.005  [0.095] 
PERFORMANCE PER GAME -----    0.931*** [0.059] -----    ----- 
GAMES PER SEASON  0.012*** [0.003] -----    0.009* [0.004] ----- 
MINUTES PER GAME  0.021  [0.021] -----    0.055*** [0.010] ----- 
POINTS PER GAME   0.113*** [0.038] -----    -----    ----- 
BLOCKS PER GAME   0.027  [0.111] -----    -----    ----- 
STEALS PER GAME   -0.022 [0.144] -----    -----    ----- 
OFFENSIVE REBS PER GAME 0.150  [0.105] -----    -----    ----- 
DEFENSIVE REBS PER GAME 0.074  [0.056] -----    -----    ----- 
ASSISTS PER GAME   0.151*** [0.056] -----    -----    ----- 
TURNOVERS PER GAME  -0.216 [0.210] -----    -----    ----- 
FOULS PER GAME   -0.020 [0.093] -----    -----    ----- 
MISSED FG PER GAME  -0.147*** [0.051] -----    -----    ----- 
MISSED FT PERCENTAGE -1.000** [0.405] -----    -1.014** [0.431] ----- 
PERFORMANCE PER 48 MINS -----    -----    -----    0.916 *** [0.065] 
BLOCKS PER 48 MINS  -----    -----    0.060  [0.061] ----- 
STEALS PER 48 MINS  -----    -----    -0.148 [0.078] ----- 
POINTS PER 48 MINS       -----    -----    0.036 * [0.018] ----- 
OFF REBS PER 48 MINS  -----    -----    0.090*** [0.030] ----- 
DEF REBS PER 48 MINS  -----    -----    0.034  [0.034] ----- 
ASSISTS PER 48 MINS  -----    -----    0.073*** [0.028] ----- 
TURNOVERS PER 48 MINS  -----    -----    -0.095 [0.089] ----- 
FOULS PER 48 MINS   -----    -----    -0.078*** [0.035] ----- 
MISSED FG PER 48 MINS  -----    -----    -0.038 [0.026] ----- 
EXPERIENCE    0.0998 [0.054] -----    0.067  [0.053] ----- 
EXPERIENCE SQUARED  -0.012*** [0.004] -----    -0.010*** [0.004] ----- 
LOG LAG MSA POPULATION -0.698 [2.524] -0.916 [2.550] -0.424 [2.424] -0.613 [2.444] 
LOG LAG MSA INCOME   -1.178 [1.787] -1.351 [1.692] -1.190 [1.532] -1.328 [1.503] 
LOG LAG MSA EMPLOYMENT 0.664  [2.260] 0.883  [2.022] 0.342  [2.096] 0.454  [1.994] 
LAG CRIME RATE    -.0001 [.0002] -.0002 [.0002] -.0001 [.0003] -.0001 [.0002]  
LAG STUDENT-TEACHER  -0.030 [0.059] -0.032 [0.063] -0.037 [0.062] -0.036 [0.066] 
TEAM WINS LAST SEASON -0.007 [0.006] -0.006 [0.005] -0.005 [0.006] -0.004 [0.005] 
100*[PPP-1]   ($COUNTRY/$US) -0.169*** [0.052] -0.164*** [0.048] -0.145*** [0.046] -0.141 [0.047] 
CONTRACT RENEWAL  0.350*** [0.110] 0.342*** [0.104] 0.365*** [0.103] 0.355  [0.102] 
PERCENT CAP AVAILABLE 0.004  [0.003] 0.004  [0.003] 0.004  [0.003] 0.004  [0.003] 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Number of Observations  744    744    744    744 
R2      0.731    0.728    0.727    0.724 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a ***=Significant at 0.01, **=Significant at 0.02, *=Significant at 0.05 
b Each regression controls for YEAR and TEAM dummies. 
c Standard errors clustered on TEAM and YEAR in parenthesis. 
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                                                   Table 2.7: Regression of Different Measures of Skill on Relative Income Tax Rate, Weighted by Contract Length  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Explanatory Variable    NBA EFFICIENCY  NBA EFFICIENCY GAME SCORE  GAME SCORE  WIN SCORE   WIN SCORE              
       PER GAME  PER 48 MINUTES PER GAME  PER 48 MINUTES PER GAME  PER 48 MINUTES 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
RELATIVE INCOME TAX RATE -0.033 [0.050]  -0.016 [0.057] -0.051 [0.045] -0.045 [0.062] -0.117** [0.048] -0.182*** [0.047] 
RELATIVE PROPERTY TAX RATE     -0.450 [0.272]  -0.356 [0.305] -0.486 [0.284] -0.391 [0.322] -0.413 [0.258] -0.375 [0.269] 
RELATIVE SALES TAX RATE  -0.005 [0.145] 0.124  [0.140] 0.041  [0.162] 0.178  [0.134] -0.021 [0.135] 0.020  [0.123] 
CENTER      -0.080 [0.114] 0.424*** [0.145] -0.349*** [0.114] -0.061 [0.140] 0.695*** [0.137] 1.186*** [0.132] 
FORWARD     0.128  [0.132] 0.307*** [0.111] -0.020 [0.134] 0.067  [0.130] 0.589 *** [0.128] 0.795*** [0.101] 
LOG LAG MSA POPULATION  -3.071 [2.221] -3.333*** [1.096] -3.579 [2.425] -3.715*** [0.752] -1.478 [2.332] -1.411 [1.337] 
LOG LAG MSA EMPLOYMENT  1.442  [1.674] 2.086  [1.241] 1.690  [1.563] 2.172*** [0.786] 1.090  [2.310] 1.165  [1.789] 
LOG LAG MSA INCOME   -1.777 [1.637] -2.169* [1.002] -1.614 [1.837] -1.923 [1.339] -1.172 [1.513] -1.044 [1.011] 
100*[PPP-1]   ($COUNTRY/$US)  0.219*** [0.068] 0.259 *** [0.059] 0.196*** [0.071] 0.197** [0.087] 0.157*** [0.050] 0.130** [0.051] 
TEAM WINS LAST SEASON  0.017  [0.009] 0.013  [0.009] 0.016  [0.009] 0.013  [0.010] 0.013  [0.008] 0.007  [0.006] 
LAG CRIME RATE (PER 100,000) -.0002 [.0003] .0001  [.0004] -.0002 [.0003] -.00004 [.0004] -8.94e-6 [.0003] .0002  [.0003] 
LAG STUDENT-TEACHER RATIO -0.137** [0.057] -0.079 [0.055] -0.142*** [0.055] -0.091* [0.044] -0.145 [0.075] -0.117* [0.064] 
CONTRACT RENEWAL   0.789*** [0.149] 0.725*** [0.159] 0.789 *** [0.147] 0.755*** [0.169] 0.659  [0.107] 0.548*** [0.123] 
PERCENT OF CAP AVAILABLE 0.009  [0.005] 0.006  [0.004] 0.008 * [0.004] 0.007* [0.003] 0.008  [0.004] 0.005  [0.005] 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R2       0.282    0.263    0.2677   0.228    0.327    0.402 
a ***=Significant at 0.01, **=Significant at 0.02, *=Significant at 0.05.  b Each regression controls for YEAR and TEAM dummies.  
c Cluster robust standard errors on TEAM and YEAR in brackets11. d All dependent variables are standardized. 
 
                                             Table 2.8: Regression of Team Outcomes on Relative Income Tax Rate, Weighted by Percentage of Free Agents on Each Team 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Explanatory Variable    REG SEASON  REG SEASON  REG SEASON  PLAYOFF   PLAYOFF   PLAYOFF 
WINS (1)   WINS (2)   WINS (3)   WINS (4)   WINS (5)   WINS (6) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
RELATIVE INCOME TAX RATE -3.977* [2.221] -3.847* [2.340] -4.074* [2.164] -2.290 [1.415]   -2.251 [1.465] -2.422 [1.478] 
RELATIVE PROPERTY TAX RATE     -----     -45.572  [324.3] -391.148 [366.5] -----    -40.673 [188.9] -118.344 [255.1] 
RELATIVE SALES TAX RATE  -----    597.347  [0.114] 290.557  [658.2] -----    260.584 [219.1] 152.170 [186.4] 
LOG LAG MSA POPULATION  -----    -----    -27.747 [37.07] -----    -----    -37.481 [14.31] 
LOG LAG MSA EMPLOYMENT  -----    -----    20.944 [50.25] -----    -----    28.730 [14.47] 
LOG LAG MSA INCOME   -----    -----    13.330 [47.04] -----    -----    -10.141 [18.18] 
100*[PPP-1]   ($COUNTRY/$US)  -----    -----    -458.823  [298.0] -----    -----    -102.007 [109.4] 
TEAM WINS LAST SEASON  -----    -----    0.233*  [0.122] -----    -----    0.046  [0.056] 
LAG CRIME RATE (PER 100,000) -----    -----    -0.002 [0.009] -----    -----    -.0005 [0.002] 
LAG STUDENT-TEACHER RATIO -----    -----    -0.744 [2.200] -----    -----    0.531  [1.297] 
PERCENT OF CAP AVAILABLE -----    -----    -0.023 [0.134] -----    -----    -0.003 [0.037] 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Number of Observations   206    206    206    206    206    206 
R2       0.449    0.453    0.484    0.437    0.443    0.469 
a ***=Significant at 0.01, **=Significant at 0.05, *=Significant at 0.10 
b Each regression controls for YEAR and TEAM dummies. c Cluster robust standard errors on TEAM and YEAR in brackets.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HOW THE NUTRITIONAL CONTENT OF SCHOOL PROVIDED MEALS  
AFFECTS STUDENT OUTCOMES 
Joint with Mirinda L. Martin 
 
3.1. Introduction 
There has recently been an emphasis on decreasing childhood obesity and increasing the 
health of schoolchildren in the United States.  Since many students may consume as many as half 
their daily calories at school (The White House, 2010), increasing the nutritional content of 
school provided meals is one of the potential mechanisms recommended for achieving these 
goals.  In 2004, a federal mandate was created that required all school districts participating in 
the National School Lunch Program to implement a local wellness program by July 2006.   
The Buffalo Public School District implemented the Healthier Options for Public 
Schoolchildren (HOPS) program in some of their schools during the fall of 2007, after seeing 
positive results from a similar study implemented in the School District of Osceola County, 
Florida.39  HOPS increased the nutritional content of the food provided at school during 
breakfast, lunch, and extended-day snack times.  It was expected that HOPS would improve 
health and wellbeing as measured by decreased weight and BMI, as it did in the School District 
of Osceola County.  However, programs like HOPS can have other benefits for schoolchildren, 
such as improved academic outcomes  
There are several mechanisms through which improvements in nutrition may serve to 
enhance students’ academic and behavioral outcomes.  Sorhaindo & Feinstein (2006) posit 
several possible explanations: (1) students may be able to learn better, (2) students may be 
healthier and thus have fewer absences, and (3) students’ behavior may improve, causing fewer 
disruptions in the classroom. 
 Several studies show that improvements in nutrition can enhance cognitive ability, observed 
intelligence, and concentration among school-aged children.  For example, Politt (1993) shows 
that iron deficiency, even in early stages, can decrease dopamine transmission, thus negatively 
impacting cognition. Deficiencies in other vitamins and minerals, specifically thiamine, vitamin 
E, vitamin B, iodine, and zinc, are shown to inhibit cognitive abilities and mental concentration 
                                                 
39 See Hollar et al (2010).  
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(Chenoweth, 2007; Greenbaum, 2007a; Greenbaum, 2007b; Bryan, Osendarp, Hughes, 
Calvaresi, Baghurst, & van Klinken, 2004; Delange, 2000; Sandstead, 2000).  Additionally, 
amino acid and carbohydrate supplementation can improve perception, intuition, and reasoning 
(Lieberman, 2003; Frisvold, 2012).  There are also a number of studies showing that 
improvements in nutrient intake can influence the cognitive ability and observed intelligence 
levels of school-aged children (Benton & Roberts, 1988; Schoenthaler, Amos, Doraz, Kelly, & 
Wakefield, 1991; Benton & Buts, 1990; Nelson, 1992; Eysenck & Schoenthaler, 1997).  
Lambert, Agostoni, Elmadfa, Hulsof, Krause, & Livingstone et al. (2004) observe that nutrition 
can also impact cognitive development in younger children. 
If improvements in nutrition make students healthier, then students are likely to have fewer 
absences and attend class more regularly.  The result is that: (1) students will have more time in 
class, and (2) students will have fewer interruptions in learning over the course of the school 
year.  Additionally, students’ behavior may improve and cause fewer disruptions in the 
classroom, creating a better learning environment for each student in the class.  Kleinman, 
Murphy, Little, Pagano, Wehler, & Regal et al. (1998) focus on student behavior, and show that 
malnutrition leads to behavior problems.  Jones, Borg, Boulware, McCarthy, Sherwin, & 
Tamborlane (1995) examine the effects of sugar on healthy children, and find that sugar has a 
negative impact on child behavior; glucose consumption induces “hormonal, symptomatic, and 
neurophysiologic changes in healthy children.”  However, these effects are not present for 
children who consume either a balanced diet or mixed meals that include protein, fat, complex 
carbohydrates, and fiber; these limit reductions in plasma glucose levels (Jones et al., 1995). 
In this paper, we test how the implementation of the HOPS program affected students’ 
academic achievement, attendance, and behavior.  To estimate the causal effect of the HOPS 
intervention on these outcomes, we estimate a difference-in-differences model using a unique 
and comprehensive restricted-use dataset from the Buffalo Public School District for the 2003-
2004 through 2008-2009 school years.  In particular, the Buffalo Public School District is the 
ideal setting to study this particular issue because over 75% of the students in the district receive 
free or reduced-price lunch, so the likelihood that students actually eat school lunch in this 
school district is high.  
We find that students in schools that implemented HOPS had a statistically significant 
increase in standardized math test scores compared to students in untreated schools, particularly 
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among low ability students, higher income students, and females.  However, inclusion of the 
students’ demographic characteristics attenuates the estimated impact of the HOPS invention.  
Additionally, we find that the intervention had no statistically significant impact on standardized 
English test scores, or on behavioral outcomes such as attendance or disciplinary suspensions.  
Although HOPS was originally initiated as a way to improve students’ health, interventions like 
HOPS may also improve academic outcomes, particularly standardized math test scores, 
especially among lower ability students, females, and higher income students. 
 
3.2 Background Studies 
Advocates of child health have experimented with students’ diets in the United States for 
more than twenty years.  Initial studies focused on improving the health of students.  However, 
in more recent years, sociologists and a few economists have looked more closely at the impact 
of a student’s diet and nutrition on academic and behavioral outcomes.  For instance, Florence, 
Asbridge, & Veugelers (2008) find that a higher quality diet is associated with better 
performance on exams.  Programs focused on increasing students’ health also show modest 
improvements in students’ academic test scores.  Meyers, Sampson, Wietzman, Rogers, & 
Kayne (1989) find that participation in the School Breakfast Program among low-income 
children who qualified led to higher test scores and lower tardiness and absence rates.40  Other 
studies find that improving the quality of students’ diets led to students being on task more often, 
increased math test scores, possibly increased reading test scores, and increased attendance 
(Powell, Walker, Chang, & Grantham-McGregor, 1998; Cueto, 2001; Storey, Pearce, Ashfield-
Watt, Wood, Baines, & Nelson, 2011; Hollar, Messiah, Lopez-Mitnik, Hollar, Almon, & 
Agatston, 2010).  Additionally, a study by Price (2012) shows that eliminating the sale of soft 
drinks in vending machines in schools had a positive effect on behavioral outcomes such as 
tardiness and disciplinary referrals. 
Several studies indicate that improving the nutritional content of meals matters much more 
for schoolchildren who are malnourished, or for those who are economically disadvantaged 
(Simeon & Grantham-McGregor, 1989; Cueto, Jacoby, & Pollitt, 1998; Hollar et al., 2010).  
Likely, this is because the economically disadvantaged have experienced a direct impediment to 
their cognitive abilities due to the lack of nourishment; once their primary physical needs are 
                                                 
40 See also Kleinman et al (2002). 
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satisfied, students are then better able to concentrate on learning and thinking through problems 
(Pertz & Putnam, 1982).  Since over 85% of the students in the Buffalo Public School District 
qualify for free or reduced price meals at school, we should expect a program that focuses on 
increasing the nutritional content of meals to provide positive effects on students’ academic 
outcomes, as well as health outcomes.   
While this study focuses on the long term effect of increasing the nutritional content of 
school meals, there have been a few studies that look directly at increasing nutritional content 
and/or calories in the very short term with the intention of having an immediate effect, such as on 
exam days.  Figlio & Winicki (2005) find evidence that schools in Virginia have strategically 
increased the amount of calories served to students in their school lunches on exam days.41  In 
their study, they find evidence that students who received an average of 100 more calories on 
exam days as compared to similar students performed better on their exams in both math and 
reading, and the effect was greater for those schools that increased the offered calories the most 
within the acceptable guidelines.  In another study, Simeon and Grantham-McGregor (1989) find 
that students who received breakfast prior to taking a series of tests performed better than those 
who only had a cup of hot tea.  Cueto (2001) summarizes several studies focused on the effects 
of fasting or skipping breakfast on student’s performance, and shows that fasting does have a 
negative effect on students’ performance, specifically when it comes to memory and visual 
perception.  Correspondingly, Imberman & Kugler (2012), using quasi-random timing in its 
introduction, find that a program that serves breakfast to students directly in the classroom 
increased students’ math and reading test scores.   
There are also a couple of studies that examine, with a more long term focus, the effects of 
programs that increase the nutritional content of school meals.  Belot & James (2011) look at the 
Feed Me Better program initiated in a borough near London, England.  They find that the 
increased nutritional content of school meals led to an improvement in academic outcomes at the 
individual level, and a decrease in absences at the school level.  They also find that the 
implementation of the program did not decrease take-up rates of school lunch at the schools.  
Though able to provide credible evidence of their results, our dataset enables us to look at 
absences at the individual level and control for the effect of individual teachers on the 
                                                 
41 The National School Lunch Program offers considerable flexibility in the amount of calories served daily 
provided schools conform to certain nutritional guidelines over the course of the week.   
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improvement in academic outcomes.   
Another study analyzes the initial introduction of the Healthier Options for Public 
Schoolchildren program among those students that received free or reduced lunch in the School 
District of Osceola County, Florida.  Hollar et al. (2010) find reductions in the BMI of students 
in HOPS schools, though these improvements disappeared over the three month summer break 
from school.  They also find evidence of improvements in math and reading scores, although the 
improvements in reading scores were not statistically significant (Hollar et al., 2010).  However, 
their study was comprised of only four treatment schools and one comparison school, and the 
results of their analysis rest heavily on the particular control school that they chose.  In this study 
we focus on the effects of the HOPS program in the Buffalo Public School District using data 
from the entire universe of students in grades three through eight. 
Due to data limitations, many of the aforementioned studies do not control for lags in student 
test scores and none control for the influence of individual teachers.  We are able to include 
exam scores prior to the initiation of the HOPS program and observe the changes in exam scores 
for each student in the years before and after the implementation of the program.  Additionally, 
we include teacher fixed effects. Changes in test scores may be highly influenced by individual 
teachers, and failure to include teacher fixed effects may bias the results if the quality of teachers 
at treated and untreated schools changes over time.42  While we are able to include teacher fixed 
effects, we find ex-post that their inclusion has little effect on our results as it pertains to this 
particular study. 
 
3.3 The HOPS Program 
The goal of the HOPS program was to improve the health and nutrition of students in the 
Buffalo Public School District.  The program had three components: increasing the nutritional 
content of the meals offered at school, teaching the students more about nutrition and focusing 
on a particular fruit or vegetable each month, and sending home information to students’ families 
encouraging a healthier lifestyle at home.  The additional cost of the program was less than $1 
per student per month.  The Buffalo Public School District increased the nutritional content of 
school meals by incorporating or substituting foods that were low in fat (particularly foods low 
in saturated fat and zero trans fats), high in fiber, and contained little added sugar.  They included 
                                                 
42 See Rockoff (2004). 
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many more fruits and vegetables, and often obtained them from local farmers.  HOPS schools 
replaced white bread with whole grain breads, white rice with brown rice, white potatoes with 
sweet potatoes, and frozen fruits and vegetables with fresh ones.  Additionally, these schools 
incorporated low-fat dairy and cheeses and whole grain sugar cookies into their meals, used 
whole grain breading for the chicken and whole grain crust for the pizza, and cut back on the 
amount of chocolate milk served. 
The Buffalo Public School District emphasized nutrition education for students and their 
families through the use of “HOPS Foods of the Month”, where two foods were chosen each 
month to focus on.  For instance, in September, the Foods of the Month were Whole Grains and 
Tomatoes.  Additionally, schools educated students about the importance of physical activity and 
incorporated more physical activity during the school day. 
While the comparison schools did not receive the HOPS program, HOPS did have an indirect 
effect on the nutritional content of food offered at these schools.  The comparison schools had 
access to whole grain breads because all schools in the district used the same bread distributor. 
The comparison schools also replaced white potatoes with sweet potatoes at times, although not 
with the frequency of the schools that participated in the program.  Therefore, the comparison 
schools may be partially contaminated with the treatment.  Contamination of the comparison 
schools only happened with regards to the nutritional content of school meals; comparison 
schools did not adapt any other aspects of the program, such as physical activity or nutrition 
education.  Since the control schools may be contaminated, our estimates of the effect of the 
HOPS program likely understate the true impact of the program. 
 
3.4 Data Description 
In order to examine the impact that nutritional improvements in school lunches have on 
students’ academic and behavioral outcomes, we use administrative records from the Buffalo 
Public School District (BPSD), a school district located in a large urban area that is comprised of 
more than sixty public schools.  This is a unique and detailed restricted-use longitudinal dataset 
of all students in kindergarten through eighth grade in the Buffalo Public School District between 
the 2003-2004 and 2008-2009 school years.   We are able to observe each student’s attendance, 
recorded disciplinary incidents, teacher, grade, school, and other demographic characteristics: 
gender, race, free/reduced lunch status, English language proficiency, and disability status.  
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Additionally, we are able to observe the New York State Assessment Test scores for 
Mathematics and English Language Arts (ELA) for students in the fourth through eighth grades 
between the 2005-2006 school year and the 2008-2009 school year.43 44  
There are twelve schools in the BPSD that received the HOPS intervention during the 2007-
2008 and 2008-2009 school years.45   For our purposes, we will let all other elementary schools 
in the Buffalo Public School District serve as our comparison group.  Table 3.1 demonstrates 
how the students in HOPS schools compare to students in the comparison schools both before 
and after the start of the HOPS program.  In the HOPS treated schools, there is a slightly greater 
share of students who are male, disabled, and economically disadvantaged, and a smaller share 
of students who are white or English proficient.  These students also have lower standardized 
math and English test scores.  From looking at the summary statistics, it appears that both math 
and English test scores are trending down over time for students in the HOPS schools, and 
trending up for students in the comparison schools.  It also seems like students in the HOPS 
schools are becoming both absent and suspended more often after the initiation of the HOPS 
program.  This is also true of the comparison schools, but to a much smaller extent.  Figure 3.1, 
which shows the trends in standardized math test scores, standardized English test scores, the 
proportion of days present, and the proportion of days not suspended, echoes these findings. 
However, Figure 3.1 also shows that test scores for students in HOPS schools seem to be 
trending downward, while test scores for students in comparison schools seem to be trending 
upward, even before the introduction of HOPS.  After the introduction of HOPS the decline in 
test scores seems to be muted for those students in HOPS schools, particularly in the first year.  
From Figure 3.1, it also appears that HOPS students go from less likely to be absent and less 
likely to be suspended to more likely to be absent and more likely to be suspended.  This would 
be difficult to explain based on our understanding of HOPS.  However, the trends are also similar 
for those students in the comparison schools.   
Figure 3.2 shows the trends in math and English test scores, the proportion of days present, 
and the proportion of days not suspended, after controlling for demographics characteristics and 
                                                 
43 We standardize math and English test scores for each student, in each grade, using the mean and standard 
deviation of each score specific to that student's grade and cohort. 
44 We also have  test scores for fourth- and eighth-graders during the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 school years, which 
we use to construct lagged test scores for students whose scores were not observed in the 2005-2006 school year. 
45The schools that received the HOPS program in the BPSD are PS #3, #6, #18, #19, #32, #37, #45, #53, #54, #74, 
#94, and #95.   
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cohort, grade, school, and teacher fixed effects.  The trends for suspensions do not change much, 
while those for absences show trends that are similar but more pronounced than those in Figure 
3.1 for both types of schools.  In the 2007-2008 school year, it seems that the HOPS program is 
helping students bring up their math and English test scores.  However, most of the gains in math 
and English scores seem to disappear in the 2008-2009 school year.  This may be because the 
funding for the HOPS program was suddenly pulled out early in 2009, around January or 
February, and students do not take the exams until the end of the spring semester.  While some 
schools tried to keep up with the tenets of the program, there was no longer any external impetus 
from the funding foundation or district administration; some of the nutritional changes to menus 
remained, but not most of the ones that distinguished the HOPS schools from the comparison 
schools.  It is possible that the effects of the nutrition program had short run effects which lasted 
only a month or two longer than the actual impetus of the program.46  
 
3.4.1 Selection 
The schools that participated in the HOPS program were not chosen at random.  Participation 
in HOPS was voluntary and was determined at a district meeting of school principals.  Since test 
scores for students in HOPS schools seem to be trending downward prior to the implementation 
of HOPS while comparison schools seem to be trending upward, an important problem that we 
face is the possibility that principals self-selected into the program in order to address this 
downward trend in test scores.  However, at the time it seems unlikely that principals realized 
that nutritional improvements in school lunches would have an impact on test scores.  Their 
decision to implement the program was likely driven by a desire to improve the health and 
nutritional wellbeing of their schoolchildren.  Furthermore, those schools that were willing to 
volunteer for the program are likely the relevant group of schools for which to estimate the 
effects of this policy, since these types of policies are generally adopted voluntarily.  
Since we are using a difference-in-differences identification strategy, it is particularly 
important that schools with outcomes that are trending downward are not deliberately self-
selecting in order to reverse the trend.  To determine if this was the case, we estimate a probit 
regression of HOPS treatment status at the school level on each outcome of interest in the year 
                                                 
46 Hollar et al (2010) find that the improvements in health and BMI found during the school year were largely 
undone during the summer months away from school, when the students returned to their typical dietary patterns. 
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before the intervention was implemented, the trend of each outcome of interest prior to the 
implementation of the treatment, and school-wide demographic characteristics of students.47  The 
marginal effects from these probit regressions are shown in Table 3.2.  Most importantly, we find 
that there are no statistically significant relationships between the treatment and trends in 
standardized math test scores, standardized English test scores, the proportion of days present, 
and the proportion of days not suspended.  In some of our specifications, we find that HOPS 
schools were more likely to have a greater number of black or other race minority students 
(Native American, Pacific Islander, Asian) and fewer suspension days per student.48 49  
 
3.5 Methodology  
In this paper, we estimate the causal impact of the Healthier Options for Public 
Schoolchildren (HOPS) program on cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes of elementary and 
middle school students in the Buffalo Public School District in the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 
academic years.  The cognitive outcomes of interest include standardized scores from New York 
State assessment tests in math and English. The non-cognitive outcomes of interest are 
attendance and disciplinary suspensions.   
To estimate the causal effect that the HOPS program had on these outcomes, we employ a 
difference-in-differences model with a single lagged outcome from a year prior to the 
introduction of the program.  Recent evidence has shown that models of this type perform much 
better than models of gains per year or student fixed effects models in the presence of mean 
reversion, since models of gains per year or student fixed effects do not allow for decay in the 
past outcome.50  All regressions use the lagged outcome from the 2005-2006 academic year.51 
Formally, let  
                                                 
47 The outcomes of interest are school-wide averages in standardized math test scores, standardized English test 
scores, the proportion of days not absent, and the proportion of days not suspended, from the 2006-2007 school year.  
The trend in each outcome is the school-level difference in the 2006-2007 and 2005-2006 school years.   
48 The fraction of black students is statistically significant in column (6), which included only demographic 
characteristics.  The proportion of days not suspended was statistically significant only in column (7), the full 
specification.  The fraction of other race students is statistically significant in columns (6) and (7). 
49 The other race category only comprises about five percent of all students.  The two schools with the highest shares 
of other race students (24% and 31%) participated in the HOPS intervention.  Without these schools, the distribution 
of other race minority students is similar between school types. 
50 See Rothstein (2010). 
51 If data from the 2005-2006 school year was not available for a given student, then the lagged outcome from the 
2004-2005 school year was used, if available.  If data from the 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 school years were not 
available for a given student, then the lagged outcome from the 2003-2004 school year was used, if available. 
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	 ,X,,!,Y =	9'Z[7! + 9\(Z[7! ∗ [7 ^) + _ ,X′,-%%`,!′,Y ′ + 
																										A + CX + aX, + 1! + bY + 	5c + $X ∗ D ∗  ,X′,-%%`,!′,Y ′ + B,X,,!,Y    (1), 
 
where 	 ,X,,!,Y	is the outcome variable of interest for student i, in grade g, in year t, in school s, 
with teacher c, and  ,X′,-%%`,!′,Y′ is the lagged value of this outcome.  Z[7! is a school-specific 
indicator variable equal to 1 if a student attends a school that participates in the HOPS program, 
and equal to 0 if a student attends a school that does not participate in the HOPS program. [7 ^ 
is a time-specific dummy variable equal to 0 in the period before the treatment, the 2006-2007 
school year, and equal to 1 in the period after the treatment, the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 
school years.  A, CX, aX,, 1!, and	bY are year, grade, cohort, school, and teacher fixed effects, 
respectively, and c is a vector of observable characteristics for each student.  Additionally, we 
include $X ∗ D ∗  ,X′,-%%`,!′,Y ′, interactions between year and grade fixed effects and the lagged 
value of the outcome variable, to account for the fact that the lagged outcome may impact the 
present outcome differentially depending on the grade level of the student and the number of 
years that have passed since the lagged outcome was observed. 
 
3.6 Results 
We present the results of the HOPS program on students’ standardized math test scores, 
standardized English test scores, proportion of days present, and proportion of days not 
suspended in Tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, respectively.  Table 3.3 shows the impact that the 
HOPS program had on standardized math test scores.  The simple difference-in-differences 
estimate in column (1), which includes a lag in the standardized math test score, shows that the 
HOPS program increased standardized math scores by 0.072 standard deviations, and this result 
is statistically significant at the 10% level.  Inclusion of year, grade, cohort, school, and teacher 
fixed effects, shown in columns (2)-(6), do not substantially change the point estimate of the 
impact of the program on standardized math test scores or the standard errors associated with this 
point estimate.  In column (7), inclusion of demographic characteristics tends to attenuate the 
estimated impact of the HOPS program.  Although the estimate in column (7) is not statistically 
significant at the 10% level, it is statistically significant at the 15% level.52  In column (8), we 
                                                 
52 In this study, the 15% level may be acceptable since there are only 48 schools, 12 of which are treated.   
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include interactions between year and grade fixed effects and the 2005 math test score, since the 
2005 math test score may impact a student’s current math score differently depending on their 
current year and grade.  Once we include year-grade-2005 test score interactions, we no longer 
have the power to measure a statistically significant impact of HOPS.  However, the coefficient 
estimate provides suggestive evidence that there is a positive effect of the program on students’ 
math test scores.53 54        
Table 3.4 shows the impact that the HOPS program had on standardized English test scores.  
The simple difference-in-differences estimate in column (1), which includes a lag in the 
standardized English test score, shows that the HOPS program increased standardized English 
test scores by 0.011 standard deviations, although this result is not statistically significant.  
Again, inclusion of year, grade, cohort, and school fixed effects, shown in columns (2)-(5), do 
not substantially change the point estimate of the impact of the program on standardized English 
test scores or the standard errors associated with this point estimate; none of these estimates are 
statistically significant.  Inclusion of teacher fixed effects in column (6) further attenuates the 
estimate of the effect of HOPS on English test scores, and this point estimate becomes negative 
in columns (7) and (8) when demographic characteristics are included.  While the HOPS 
program had a positive impact on students’ standardized math test scores, these estimates 
provide no evidence that HOPS had any impact on students’ standardized English test scores.  
Indeed, most studies show that education policies tend to have a much greater impact on math 
test scores than reading scores.  According to Rothstein (2002), "one likely cause is that students 
learn math mostly in school, while literacy also comes from habits at home…scores would suffer 
if students did less out-of-school reading or had a less literate home environment." 
Table 3.5 shows the impact that the HOPS program had on the proportion of days that 
students were present.   The hypothesis is that if students are made healthier by HOPS, then they 
                                                 
53 Some may have concerns about students switching schools in order to receive or avoid treatment of the HOPS 
intervention.  Though it is unlikely that students would actually move or apply for a boundary exception solely to 
take advantage of or avoid this program, we check to see if it makes a difference.  We use the school the student 
attended the year before the HOPS intervention was implemented as an instrument for receiving the treatment, but 
find no substantive difference in our results. 
54One potential problem is that we have standardized students’ test scores based on the overall mean and standard 
deviation in each grade and cohort, including HOPS treated students.  If the HOPS treatment has an effect on test 
scores, then allowing the HOPS treatment to affect the overall mean and standard deviation can bias our results.  To 
account for this possible bias, we re-standardize both math and English test scores using the mean and standard 
deviation of the comparison group only.  Re-standardizing by the mean and standard deviation of the comparison 
group alone has no substantive effect on the results.   
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will have fewer illnesses and be able to attend school more often.  However, depending on the 
specification, Table 3.5 shows that the HOPS program caused students to attend school between 
0.61%-0.71% less, approximately one day less each year.  However, these results are not 
statistically significant.  Since we do not have information on why students are absent, it may be 
the case that students miss school for reasons other than illness.  Table 3.6 shows the impact that 
the HOPS program had on the proportion of days that students were not suspended.  Depending 
on the specification, students are suspended about one- to two-thirds of a day more per year on 
average when the HOPS program is in effect, although these estimates are not statistically 
significant.  While we believed a priori that HOPS could impact the ability for students to learn 
might come about by reducing absences and improving behavior, we do not find evidence of 
these mechanisms.  This suggests that math scores increase mainly because improvements in 
nutrition enhance intuition, reasoning, and concentration, but not because students are present 
more often or are suspended less; our results may also be driven by minor improvements in 
behavior not captured by observed suspensions. 
 
3.6.1 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
There is a large amount of evidence that health policies may have a greater effect in 
economically advantaged children (Perry, Bishop, Taylor, Murray, Mays, & Dudovitz et al., 
1998; Müller, Danielzik, & Pusta, 2005; Plachta-Danielzik, Pust, Asbeck, Czerwinski-Mast, 
Langnase, & Fischer et al., 2007; Belot & James, 2011).  Müller et al. (2005) suggest that this is 
because health policies targeted toward children are most effective when children are treated 
alongside their parents; in particular, because HOPS schools sent pamphlets about healthy eating 
home with students, children in high-socioeconomic status families are more likely to have 
healthy eating habits translated into their home environment by their parents.  Studies also show 
that short-term impacts of health policies are stronger among girls than boys, possibly because 
boys are more reluctant to accept changes in their diet, such as increased intake of vegetables, or 
less likely to make better food choices despite an increased knowledge of proper nutritional 
practices (Kelder, Perry, Lytle, & Klepp, 1995; Perry et al., 1998; Müller et al., 2005; Belot & 
James, 2011).  There is also reason to believe that low-ability children will experience greater 
academic gains from health interventions like HOPS if low-ability children are those most in 
need of improvements in nutrient intake (Schoenthaler & Bier, 1999).  We examine the 
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heterogeneous effects of the HOPS initiative based on ability, socioeconomic status, and gender. 
 
3.6.1.1 High Ability vs. Low Ability Students 
In an effort to compare students who are more similar, we split students by ability based on 
each student’s lagged test score with the hypothesis being that low ability students are more in 
need of the nutrients provided by the higher nutritional content of HOPS meals.  This allows us 
to directly compare low ability students in HOPS schools to low ability students in comparison 
schools, and high ability students in HOPS schools to high ability students in comparison 
schools.  A student is grouped as a high ability math student if his/her lagged standardized math 
test score is greater than or equal to zero, and a student is grouped as a low ability math student if 
his/her lagged standardized math test score is less than zero. 
Table 3.7 shows the impact that the HOPS program had on standardized math test scores for 
high ability and low ability math students.  For low ability math students, columns (1)-(8) show 
that the HOPS program increased standardized math scores by 0.076-0.094 standard deviations.  
The result is statistically significant at the 10% level in columns (1)-(7) and at the 15% level in 
column (8).  For high ability math students, the HOPS program also increased their standardized 
math test scores, though by less than the increase for low ability students.  However, the effect of 
the program for high ability math students, and the difference between the effects for high ability 
and low ability math students, are both statistically insignificant.55  No statistically significant 
effects can be found for standardized English test scores, regardless of ability level. 
 
3.6.1.2 Economically Advantaged vs. Economically Disadvantaged 
Table 3.8 shows the effect of HOPS on standardized math test scores for economically 
advantaged and economically disadvantaged students, where economically disadvantaged means 
that the student qualified for free or reduced price lunches and economically advantaged means 
that the student did not.  HOPS had very large effects for economically advantaged students; 
based on columns (3)-(8), which include grade fixed effects, the HOPS initiative increased math 
test scores by between 0.117-0.150 standard deviations, and these results are statistically 
                                                 
55 We find that the effect of HOPS on high ability students is statistically significant at the 10% level in column (6), 
when year, grade, cohort, school, and teacher fixed effects are controlled for but demographic characteristics are not. 
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significant at the 10% level.56  For economically disadvantaged students, although the magnitude 
of the effect is positive, HOPS had no statistically significant effect on standardized math test 
scores.  However, the difference of the effect for economically advantaged vs. economically 
disadvantaged students is also statistically insignificant.  For standardized English test scores, we 
find no statistically significant effects, regardless of socioeconomic status. 
Economically disadvantaged students have a higher probability of consuming school meals 
since they receive free and reduced-price lunches.  These students are also more likely to suffer 
from poor eating habits.  However, as mentioned earlier, several studies indicate that programs 
specifically targeted toward decreasing obesity in children have a larger effect for students from 
higher socioeconomic groups, so it is not surprising that we find that this extends to academic 
outcomes as well (Muller et al, 2005; Plachta et al, 2007). 
 
3.6.1.3 Male vs. Female 
We examine the different effects of the program on both female and male students.  The 
effect of programs similar to HOPS that combine teaching students about healthy eating, fruits, 
and vegetables with the opportunity to consume more nutritious foods for school meals show that 
female students are much more likely to incorporate what they learn and actually consume more 
of the healthier food, particularly vegetables (Perry et al., 1998).  Table 3.9 reveals the impact of 
HOPS when we allow for different effects of the program on males and females.  HOPS 
increased standardized math test scores among females by 0.090-0.098 standard deviations in 
columns (1)-(5), and the effect is statistically significant at the 10% level.  However, in columns 
(6)-(8), which include teacher fixed effects, the effect of HOPS on standardized math test scores 
for females is not statistically significant, although the size of the coefficients still provide some 
suggestive evidence of a positive impact on math scores among females.  For males, the effect is 
positive, although generally not statistically significant.  However, the difference between the 
effect for males and females is also not statistically significant.  Similar to our other results, we 
find no statistically significant effects for standardized English test scores, regardless of gender. 
 
 
                                                 
56 The effect is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (5)-(7), when school fixed effects are controlled 
for but grade-year-2005 math score interactions are not.   
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3.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the effects of the Healthier Options for Public Schoolchildren 
(HOPS) program on cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes for students in the Buffalo Public 
School District.  We use a difference-in-differences approach to compare the changes in 
outcomes of students that attended schools participating in the HOPS program with those that 
attended non-participating schools.  We find that students in schools with the HOPS program had 
a statistically significant increase in standardized math scores. However, inclusion of 
demographic characteristics tends to attenuate the estimated impact of the HOPS program and 
render the point estimates statistically insignificant.  The HOPS program had no statistically 
significant impact on standardized English test scores, attendance, or suspensions.  Since 
students are not absent or suspended less often, the evidence suggests that math scores increase 
largely due to improvements in cognition and concentration, although we cannot rule out  minor 
improvements in behavior not captured by observed suspensions.  
We then examine the existence of potentially heterogeneous treatment effects based on 
ability, socioeconomic status, and gender.  We split students into high ability and low ability 
groups based on each student’s lagged test score, and find that the HOPS program increased 
standardized math test scores for low ability math students in our full specification, and this 
result is generally statistically significant at the 10% level.  However, the effect of the program 
for high ability math students, and the difference between the effects for high ability and low 
ability math students, are both statistically insignificant.  For economically advantaged students, 
HOPS had very large statistically significant effects on standardized math test scores.  For 
economically disadvantaged students the effects are much smaller and not statistically 
significant.  Nevertheless, the difference of the effect for economically advantaged vs. 
economically disadvantaged students is also statistically insignificant.  Similarly, we find larger 
effects of HOPS among females; however, the effect is not statistically different from the effect 
for males.  Furthermore, we find no effect of the HOPS program on standardized English test 
scores, regardless of initial ability, socioeconomic status, or gender.   
Our results imply that, although HOPS was originally initiated as a way to improve students’ 
health, interventions like HOPS may also improve academic outcomes such as standardized math 
test scores.  These effects may be larger for particular groups of students: lower ability students, 
higher income students, and females.  The HOPS program cost less than an additional $1 per 
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student per month.  When considering whether to implement such a program, schools may 
consider the potential benefits that programs such as HOPS might have on academic outcomes 
such as test scores in addition to the intended health benefits associated with them. 
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         Table 3.1: Summary Statistics by Year and Treatment Status 
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Table 3.2: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions Describing Selection into the HOPS Program 
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Table 3.3: The Impact of HOPS on Standardized Math Test Scores 
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Table 3.4: The Impact of HOPS on Standardized English Test Scores 
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Table 3.5: The Impact of HOPS on the Proportion of Days Present 
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Table 3.6: The Impact of HOPS on the Proportion of Days Not Suspended 
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Table 3.7: The Impact of the HOPS Program on Math Test Scores, by Math Ability 
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Table 3.8: The Impact of the HOPS Program on Math Test Scores, by Socioeconomic Status 
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Table 3.9: The Impact of the HOPS Program on Math Test Scores, by Gender 
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Figure 3.1: Outcome Trends by Treatment Status 
 
 
      (a)                 (b) 
 
      (c)                 (d) 
Figure 3.1a, Figure 3.1b, Figure 3.1c, and Figure 3.1d show the trends in standardized math test 
scores, standardized English test scores, the proportion of days present, and the proportion of 
days not suspended, respectively, for HOPS treated schools and control schools. 
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Figure 3.2: Outcome Trends by Treatment Status, Controlling for Observable Characteristics 
 
  
      (a)                 (b) 
 
      (c)                 (d) 
Figure 3.2a, Figure 3.2b, Figure 3.2c, and Figure 3.2d show the trends in standardized math test 
scores, standardized English test scores, the proportion of days present, and the proportion of 
days not suspended, respectively, for HOPS treated schools and control schools; each controls 
for demographic characteristics and cohort, grade, school, and teacher fixed effects. 
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